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THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF FUTURE EXPENDITURE ON CONTRACTS IN TERMS OF 
SECTION 24C 
 
Section 24C of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 (‘the Act’) provides for a deduction of 
future expenditure that will be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his 
obligations under a contract from which the taxpayer derived income.  
 
Due to uncertainties regarding the meaning of certain words and phrases used in section 
24C, the first aim of this assignment was to determine the meaning of the word 
‘expenditure’ and the phrase ‘will be incurred’ as used in section 24C. The second aim was 
to establish how a taxpayer will prove with certainty that he will incur future expenditure in 
the performance of his obligations under a contract. This was done by discussing the 
effect of contractual terms and other circumstances and by taking into account certain 
additional guidelines regarding the interpretation of section 24C provided for in 
Interpretation Note: No. 78 (‘IN 78’). 
 
It was established that the word ‘expenditure’ means the amount of money spent, including 
the disbursement of other assets with a monetary value. The word ‘expenditure’ also 
specifically includes the voluntary payments and disbursements of assets. The word 
‘expenditure’ can also include a loss if the word ‘loss’ can be equated to the word 
‘expenditure’.  
 
The phrase ‘will be incurred’ implies that the taxpayer will, in a subsequent year of 
assessment, have an unconditional obligation to pay for expenditure, which must arise 
from the taxpayer’s obligations to perform under the contract.  
 
Contractual terms and other circumstances can indicate whether there is certainty that 
future expenditure will be incurred as aforementioned. Conditions and warranties are 
contractual terms that indicate that there is uncertainty regarding the taxpayer’s obligations 
to perform under the contract. A time clause in a contract can indicate that there is 
certainty regarding the taxpayer’s obligations to perform under the contract. Similar 
contracts with similar conditional obligations to perform cannot be grouped together in 
order to determine the probability, and thus the certainty, that future expenditure will be 
incurred in the performance of the taxpayer’s obligations under a contract. The probability 
that a taxpayer will perform his unconditional obligation under the contract must, however, 
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be proved in order to demonstrate that there is certainty regarding the incurral of the future 
expenditure.  
 
IN 78 does not specify whether a loss which can, in certain circumstances, be equated to 
the word ‘expenditure’, is deductible under section 24C. This should be clarified. The new 
undefined phrases (a high degree of probability, inevitability, certainty and potentially 
contractually obligatory), as used in IN 78, might cause confusion when interpreting 
section 24C. These phrases should be defined and it should be explained how the high 
degree will be measured.  
 
Lastly, is was shown that an anomaly occurs regarding trading stock at hand at the end of 
a year of assessment, which will be utilised in a subsequent year of assessment in the 
performance of the taxpayer’s obligations under a contract. Such trading stock does not 
represent ‘future expenditure’ and must be excluded from the section 24C allowance. 
However, due to the interplay between section 24C and section 22(1), the taxpayer does 
not receive any tax relief for the expenditure actually incurred to acquire the closing trading 
stock in the year in which such trading stock is acquired. It is, therefore, questioned 
whether the established interpretation of section 24C is in agreement with the Legislator’s 
original intention with section 24C namely, to match income received under a contract with 
the related deductible expenditure.  
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DIE AFTREKBAARHEID VAN TOEKOMSTIGE ONKOSTE OP KONTRAKTE 
INGEVOLGE VAN ARTIKEL 24C 
 
Artikel 24C van die Inkomstebelastingwet No. 58 van 1962 (‘die Wet’) voorsien ŉ 
aftrekking vir toekomstige onkoste wat deur die belastingpligtige aangegaan sal word in 
die nakoming van sy verpligtinge ingevolge ŉ kontrak waaruit hy inkomste verkry het. 
 
As gevolg van onsekerhede ten opsigte van die betekenis van sekere woorde en frases 
wat in artikel 24C gebruik word, was die eerste doelstelling van hierdie navorsings-
werkstuk om die betekenis van die woord ‘onkoste’ en die frase ‘aangegaan sal word’, 
soos wat dit in artikel 24C gebruik word, te bepaal. Die tweede doelstelling was om vas te 
stel hoe 'n belastingpligtige met sekerheid sal bewys dat hy toekomstige onkoste sal 
aangaan in die nakoming van sy verpligtinge ingevolge ŉ kontrak. Dit is gedoen deur die 
effek van kontraksbedinge en ander omstandighede te bespreek en deur sekere 
bykomende riglyne ten opsigte van die interpretasie van artikel 24C, soos vervat in 
Interpretasienota No. 78 (‘IN 78’), in ag te neem. 
 
Daar is vasgestel dat die woord ‘onkoste’ die bedrag van geld wat bestee word, insluitend 
die uitbetaling van ander bates met 'n geldwaarde, beteken. Die woord ‘onkoste’ sluit ook 
spesifiek vrywillige betalings en uitbetalings van bates in. Die woord ‘onkoste’ kan ook 'n 
verlies insluit, indien die woord ‘verlies’ gelyk gestel kan word aan die woord ‘onkoste’. 
  
Die frase ‘aangegaan sal word’ impliseer dat die belastingpligtige, in 'n daaropvolgende 
jaar van aanslag, 'n onvoorwaardelike verpligting sal hê om vir onkostes te betaal. Hierdie 
onkostes moet ontstaan weens die belastingpligtige se verpligtinge ingevolge die kontrak. 
  
Kontraksbedinge en ander omstandighede kan aandui of daar sekerheid is dat die 
toekomstige onkoste, soos hierbo genoem, aangegaan sal word. Voorwaardes en 
waarborge is kontraksbedinge wat daarop dui dat daar onsekerheid is rakende die 
belastingpligtige se verpligtinge om ingevolge die kontrak op te tree. ŉ Tydsklousule in 'n 
kontrak kan aandui dat daar sekerheid is rakende die belastingpligtige se nakoming van sy 
verpligtinge ingevolge die kontrak. Soortgelyke kontrakte, met soortgelyke voorwaardelike 
verpligtinge kan nie saam gegroepeer word ten einde te bepaal of dit waarskynlik, en 
gevolglik seker is dat toekomstige onkoste in die nakoming van ŉ belastingpligtige se 
verpligtinge ingevolge die kontrak aangaan sal word nie. Die waarskynlikheid dat ŉ 
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belastingpligtige sy onvoorwaardelike verpligting ingevolge die kontrak sal nakom moet 
egter bewys word ten einde aan te dui dat daar sekerheid is dat toekomstige onkoste 
aangegaan sal word. 
 
IN 78 spesifiseer nie of 'n verlies wat, in sekere omstandighede, gelyk gestel kan word aan 
die woord ‘onkoste’, ingevolge artikel 24C aftrekbaar is nie. Duidelikheid hieromtrent moet 
verskaf word. Die nuwe, ongedefinieerde frases ('n hoë graad van waarskynlikheid, 
onafwendbaarheid, sekerheid en potensieel kontraktueel verpligtend (vry vertaal)), soos in 
IN 78 gebruik, kan moontlik verwarring veroorsaak wanneer artikel 24C geïnterpreteer 
word. Hierdie frases moet gedefinieer word en daar moet verduidelik word hoe ŉ hoë 
graad gemeet gaan word. 
 
Laastens blyk dit dat 'n teenstrydigheid ontstaan ten opsigte van handelsvoorraad op 
hande aan die einde van 'n jaar van aanslag, wat in 'n daaropvolgende jaar van aanslag 
deur die belastingpligtige in die nakoming van sy verpligtinge ingevolge 'n kontrak gebruik 
sal word. Sodanige handelsvoorraad verteenwoordig nie ‘toekomstige onkoste’ nie en 
moet by die artikel 24C toelaag uitgesluit word. Die belastingpligte ontvang egter, weens 
die wisselwerking tussen artikel 24C en artikel 22(1), nie ŉ belastingverligting vir die 
onkoste werklik aangegaan in die jaar waarin sodanige handelsvoorraad verkry is nie. Dit 
word dus bevraagteken of die bewese interpretasie van artikel 24C in ooreenstemming is 
met die Wetgewer se oorspronklike bedoeling met artikel 24C, naamlik, om inkomste 
ontvang ingevolge ŉ kontrak met die verwante aftrekbare uitgawes te paar.  
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ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY 
 
‘BPR’ – Binding Private Ruling, as issued by SARS; 
 
‘ITC’ –  Income Tax Case No.; 
 
‘OED’ – Oxford English Dictionary; 
 
‘SARS’ –  the South African Revenue Service, as defined in 
section 1 of the Income Tax Act;  
  
‘SATC’ –  the ‘South African Tax Cases Reports’, as issued by 
LexisNexis;  
 
‘the Act’ –  the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 (as amended);  
 
‘the Commissioner’ – the Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
Service, as defined in section 1 of the Income Tax 
Act; 
 
‘IN 78’ – Interpretation Note: No. 78; Allowance for future 
expenditure on contracts; 
 
‘the Explanatory Memorandum’ – Explanatory Memorandum on the Income Tax Bill of 
1980. 
 
All references to relevant pages in tax cases are the pages as given in the SATC, unless 
otherwise stated.  
 
All references to ‘section’ are to the sections in the Income Tax Act, unless otherwise 
stated. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Section 24C of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 (‘the Act’) provides for a deduction of 
future expenditure that will be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his 
obligations under a contract from which the taxpayer derived income (De Koker & 
Williams, 2011:par 8.60). 
 
Section 24C was introduced into the Act in 1980. According to the Explanatory 
Memorandum on the Income Tax Bill of 1980 (SARS, 1980:9) (‘the Explanatory 
Memorandum’), the purpose of section 24C is to address situations where income is 
received or accrued in terms of a contract in one year of assessment, and the income is to 
be utilised to finance future expenditure. The Explanatory Memorandum refers to the 
situation in the construction industry where a contractor, prior to the commencement of the 
contract, receives an advance payment to enable him to purchase material and 
equipment. This results in situations where such advance payments are recognised as 
income in the year of assessment, but are not matched by related deductible expenditure 
in the same year of assessment. Consequently, the full amount of the income is subject to 
taxation in the year of assessment in which it was received. Section 24C was inserted to 
empower the Commissioner of SARS (‘the Commissioner’) to allow a deduction in respect 
of any amount received under a contract, which will be utilised by the taxpayer to finance 
future expenditure in the performance of his obligations under that contract. Refer to 
Annexure A for the exact wording of section 24C. 
 
The phrase ‘future expenditure’ in relation to any year of assessment is defined in  
section 24C(1). The requirements that the expenditure under contention must meet, are as 
follows: 
 
 There must be an amount of expenditure; and 
 The Commissioner must be satisfied that the amount will be incurred after the end of 
the year of assessment; and 
 The amount will be allowed as a deduction from income in a subsequent year of 
assessment (section 24C(1)(a)); or 
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 The amount is in respect of the acquisition of any asset for which any deduction will 
be admissible under the provisions of the Act (section 24C(1)(b)). 
 
Sections 24C(1)(a) and (b), accordingly, stipulate that future expenditure which will be 
incurred must be deductible in terms of a provision in the Act in a subsequent year of 
assessment. Sections 24C(1)(a) and (b) thus, indirectly and, inter alia, refer to sections 
11(a) to 11(w) of the Act. These sections list deductions that are allowed in determining 
the taxable income of a taxpayer that engages in the carrying on of a trade. Section 11(x) 
brings within the scope of section 11 all other amounts allowed as a deduction from the 
income of the taxpayer in terms of any other provision in Part I of the Act (Stiglingh, 
Koekemoer, Van Schalkwyk, Wilcocks & De Swardt, 2014:166). Section 11(a) is the so-
called general deduction formula and allows for a deduction of expenditure and losses, 
actually incurred, in the production of the income, provided such expenditure and losses 
are not of a capital nature. In Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co Ltd v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue 8 SATC 13 (‘Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co Ltd v CIR’) the court 
specified that sections 11(a) and 23(g) should be read together. Section 23(g) must, 
therefore, also be taken into account when interpreting section 24C, since it prohibits the 
deduction of expenditure that is not laid out or expended for the purpose of trade. Although 
the scope of sections 24C(1)(a) and (b) is very wide, for the purpose of this assignment, 
the scope of a deductible amount will be limited to an amount that is deductible in terms of 
section 11(a). 
 
In terms of section 24C(2), the following requirements must be complied with in order to 
utilise the section 24C allowance:  
 
 The income of any taxpayer, in any year of assessment, must include or consist of an 
amount received by or accrued to him in terms of any contract; and  
 The Commissioner must be satisfied that such amount will be utilised in whole or in 
part to finance future expenditure; and  
 Such future expenditure will be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his 
obligations under such contract. 
 
Although the phrase ‘future expenditure’ is defined in section 24C(1) of the Act, the word 
‘expenditure’ is not. Other key phrases used in section 24C(2) that are not defined by the 
Act are ‘will be incurred’ and ‘in the performance of his obligations under such contract’. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
4 
 
For the purpose of interpreting and correctly applying section 24C, it is important to 
understand the meaning of these phrases.  
 
Section 24C(3) stipulates that any deduction allowed in any year of assessment in terms of 
section 24C(2) must be included in the income of the taxpayer in the following year of 
assessment. 
 
The Commissioner has, in terms of sections 24C(1) and (2), the discretion to decide 
whether the requirements of section 24C have indeed been complied with, and to 
subsequently decide on the amount of the deduction. In terms of section 102(1)(b) of the 
Tax Administration Act No. 28 of 2011, the burden to prove to the Commissioner that the 
section 24C allowance should be allowed, rests on the taxpayer. 
 
Interpretation Note: No. 78, Allowance for future expenditure on contracts (‘IN 78’) (SARS, 
2014(3)) was issued by SARS in July 2014 after comments from the public on the first and 
second Draft Interpretation Note on section 24C were considered. IN 78 discusses the 
requirements of section 24C and also provides guidance on the interpretation and 
application of section 24C. In IN 78, SARS introduces new guidelines to indicate when 
there will be certainty that expenditure ‘will be incurred in a subsequent year of 
assessment’, as required by section 24C. Furthermore, IN 78 addresses the taxpayer’s 
obligations to perform under a contract. IN 78 also indicates which expenditure may not be 
included in the section 24C allowance. IN 78 further includes references to specific types 
of contracts and gives examples to explain SARS’s interpretation of section 24C. Whether 
these guidelines on the interpretation of section 24C and the examples given by SARS are 
in agreement with the Legislator’s intention in respect of section 24C, has not yet been 
determined. To date, no research has been done to compare IN 78 with section 24C.  
 
Referring to the requirements of sections 24C(1) and (2) and to IN 78, it is clear that there 
are some uncertainties regarding the meaning of the following words and phrases used in 
section 24C: 
 
 expenditure  
 will be incurred  
 by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under a contract. 
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The meaning of these words and phrases are important when interpreting and correctly 
applying section 24C and, therefore, requires investigation.  
 
1.2 Research question 
To address the uncertainties that exist regarding the meaning of certain words and 
phrases used in section 24C, and to determine how a taxpayer will be able to prove that 
he will incur future expenditure in the performance of his obligations under a contract, the 
following three research questions are identified:  
 
 What is the meaning of the word ‘expenditure’, and the phrase ‘will be incurred’ as 
used in section 24C? 
 What indicators will serve to demonstrate that future expenditure will be incurred by 
the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under the contract? This research 
question will be addressed by exploring the following additional questions: 
 What effect do contractual terms in the contract have on the certainty that the 
taxpayer will perform his obligations under a contact and on the certainty of the 
incurral of the related future expenditure?  
 Which circumstances indicate that there is certainty that the future expenditure 
will be incurred?  
The element of certainty will be addressed by referring to the following aspects: 
‐ The definite connection that must exist between the incurral of future 
expenditure and the obligations to perform under the contract;  
‐ The contingent liability and the conditional obligation to perform under a 
contract; 
‐ The quantifiability of the future expenditure; 
‐ The certainty that future expenditure will be incurred under warranty 
contracts and maintenance and repair contracts; and 
‐ The effect of grouping similar contracts with conditional obligations to 
perform together in order to determine, based on historical data, the 
certainty that the future expenditure will be incurred. 
 Does IN 78 introduce any new guidelines, addressing the aforementioned research 
questions, and are there any shortcomings to these new guidelines?  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
6 
 
1.3 Literature review 
There are no authoritative higher court case decisions (Provincial Division of the High 
Court or the Supreme Court of Appeal) on section 24C. It is, however, meaningful to study 
available Tax Court cases as this provides insight to the Commissioner’s interpretation of 
section 24C. It also sheds light on the Court’s decisions in circumstances where the 
taxpayer and the Commissioner disagreed on the interpretation of section 24C.  
  
Each of the identified research questions is now briefly discussed in more detail, based on 
available court cases and academic writing.  
 
 What is the meaning of the word ‘expenditure’, as used in section 24C? 
 
The Legislator used the word ‘expenditure’ in section 24C. The word is not defined in 
the Act. The word is also used in section 11(a). Section 11(a) refers to the 
deductibility of expenditure and losses actually incurred in the production of income. 
In Joffe & Co (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 13 SATC 354 (‘Joffe & Co 
(Pty) Ltd v CIR’) Watermeyer CJ stated that, in relation to trading operations, 
expenditure usually refers to the voluntary payments of money, whereas losses are 
sometimes used to signify a deprivation suffered by the party concerned, usually an 
involuntary deprivation. Watermeyer CJ explained the interplay between expenditure 
and losses as follows:  
 
[W]hen trading operations cause damage to third parties and this damage 
has to be made good, then the payment which is made in satisfaction of 
such damage may properly be called a loss, but when the payment has 
been made then it can also properly be called an expenditure. (360) 
 
Watermeyer CJ highlighted the voluntary nature of expenditure and the involuntary 
nature of losses, and, in the case of payments for damages, he equated the words 
‘loss’ and ‘expenditure’. This is important, because section 24C only refers to the 
word ‘expenditure’ and it is unclear if, in the context of section 24C, ‘expenditure’ 
includes or excludes ‘losses’. 
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In ITC 1739 65 SATC 43 (‘ITC 1739’) the taxpayer wished to apply section 24C, 
however, the Commissioner disallowed the deduction. Joffe J held that the costs 
incurred to honour the commitment in terms of a warranty contract are a loss and not 
expenditure and, therefore, disallowed the section 24C deduction. This was, 
however, criticised by JutaLaw (Case no. 10723 2003 (1) JTLR 1 (GSpCrt) (‘Case 
no. 10723’), who held that the taxpayer had to incur expenditure to manufacture 
trading stock to replace the defective parts.  
 
When comparing the facts in ITC 1739 with Watermeyer CJ’s example in Joffe & Co 
(Pty) Ltd v CIR, the honouring of the warranty contract in ITC 1739 can be regarded 
as a loss, which is in agreement with the judgment of Joffe J. However, the payments 
made to manufacture the stock that must be supplied in terms of a contract that the 
taxpayer voluntarily agreed to can also be regarded as expenditure, which is in 
agreement with the view of JutaLaw on ITC 1739. There is, consequently, uncertainty 
about the Legislator’s intention with the word ‘expenditure’, as used in section 24C. 
The meaning of the word ‘expenditure’, as used in section 24C, will be addressed in 
chapter 2.  
 
 What is the meaning of the phrase ‘will be incurred’, as used in section 24C? 
 
The phrase ‘will be incurred’ is not defined in the Act. The Explanatory Memorandum 
indicates that section 24C provides for an allowance that will match the income from 
the contract in year one with future deductible expenditure. The taxpayer has, 
therefore, not yet incurred the deductible expenditure at the end of year one, but will 
incur deductible expenditure in a future year of assessment.  
 
Section 11(a), the general deduction formula, lists the requirements for deductible 
expenditure. It, inter alia, refers to expenditure that must be actually incurred. Cloete 
JA in Ackermans Ltd v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service 73 SATC 1 
(‘Ackermans Ltd v C:SARS’) defined ‘expenditure incurred’ as the undertaking of an 
obligation to pay or (which amounts to the same thing) the actual incurring of a 
liability.  
 
Exactly what the phrase ‘will be incurred’, as used in section 24C, entails will be 
addressed in chapter 2. 
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 What indicators will serve to demonstrate that future expenditure will be incurred by 
the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under the contract?  
 
The taxpayer must prove to the Commissioner that, in terms of section 24C(2), the 
future expenditure will be incurred in the performance of the taxpayer’s obligations 
under a contract. This will be addressed by the following two questions:  
 
 What effect do contractual terms in the contract have on the certainty that the 
taxpayer will perform his obligations under a contact and on the certainty of the 
incurral of the related future expenditure? 
 
Contracting parties express their intention to create specific obligations in their 
contract through the use of terms or stipulations (Van der Merwe, Van 
Huyssteen, Reinecke & Lubbe, 2007:278). A condition is a contractual term that 
qualifies the continued existence and operation of a contractual obligation, 
subject to the occurrence, or not, of an uncertain future event (Van Huyssteen, 
Van der Merwe & Maxwell, 2010:141). According to Van Huyssteen et al. 
(2010:143), it is generally recognised that an obligation exists despite the fact 
that the contract contains a suspensive condition. However, an obligation that is 
suspended by a condition cannot be enforced until fulfilment of the condition 
and, therefore, cannot be validly performed. Section 24C(2) only refers to 
‘obligations’ under a contract and does not limit the obligations to unconditional 
obligations. The effect of conditions and other contractual terms on the certainty 
that the taxpayer will perform his obligations under a contact and on the 
certainty of the incurral of related future expenditure, will be addressed in 
chapter 3.  
 
 Which circumstances indicate that there is certainty that the future expenditure 
will be incurred? 
 
- In ITC 1527 54 SATC 227 (‘ITC 1527’) the taxpayer carried on the 
business, inter alia, of a furniture dealer who sold furniture under 
instalment sales agreements. Separate to the sales transaction, a two 
year guarantee was also provided to the customers. The taxpayer 
allocated various overhead expenditure, which he would incur in the future 
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to service the instalment sales agreements, to the section 24C allowance. 
The Commissioner was, however, not satisfied with the taxpayer’s 
allocation of the overhead expenditure to the section 24C allowance. 
Melament J held that the taxpayer could not provide evidence that the 
contact imposed any obligation on him to incur the overhead expenditure 
in question.  
 
The definite connection that must exist between the incurral of future 
expenditure and the obligations to perform under the contract, and its 
effect on the certainty that future expenditure will be incurred, will be 
discussed in chapter 4. 
 
‐ In ITC 1601 58 SATC 172 (‘ITC 1601’) it was stated that if a taxpayer only 
has a contingent liability, it will not satisfy the requirement that the future 
expenditure ‘will be incurred’ in terms of section 24C. Clegg and Stretch 
(2011:par 11.11.7) criticised the decision in ITC 1601 not to allow 
contingent expenditure as follows: 
 
If expenditure is not contingent, then there will be no need for 
the section, as the liability would be absolute and a deduction 
under section 11(a) could be claimed. The wording requires the 
Commissioner to be satisfied that expenditure ‘will be incurred 
after the end of such year’, making it clear that it is the incurral 
itself which arises thereafter, and which must, by definition, be 
uncertain and contingent as at the end of the year in question. It 
is submitted that there must be in existence an enforceable and 
uncontingent obligation to perform under a contract, which 
performance will lead to the incurral of expenditure. (own 
emphasis) 
 
The difference between these two arguments thus revolves around the 
context in which the reference to a contingent liability was used. ITC 1601 
merely stated that if a taxpayer has a contingent liability it will not indicate 
that the future expenditure ‘will be incurred’ in terms of section 24C.  
ITC 1601 does not specify whether it refers to a contingent liability to pay 
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for expenditure or a contingent liability to perform under the contact. Clegg 
& Stretch (2011:par 11.11.7), however, refer to the taxpayer’s obligation to 
perform under the contract, which will lead to the incurral of expenditure, 
which may not be contingent if a taxpayer wants to satisfy the 
Commissioner that future expenditure ‘will be incurred’. 
 
The difference between a contingent liability and a conditional obligation to 
perform under a contract, and their effect on the certainty that future 
expenditure will be incurred, will be discussed in chapter 4. 
  
‐ In ITC 1601 it was stated that a clear measure of certainty must exist as to 
whether the expenditure in contention is quantified or quantifiable. In 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Edgars Stores Ltd 48 SATC 89, 
(‘CIR v Edgars Stores Ltd’), dealing with the deductibility of expenditure in 
terms of section 11(a), it was held that if an unconditional liability was 
incurred, but it cannot be quantified, the amount must be estimated based 
on available information and claimed in that tax year. This established the 
principle that the deduction in terms of section 11(a) does not depend on 
the quantifiability of the expenditure, provided that a reliable estimate of 
the expenditure can be made. 
 
Whether the same principle can be applied to section 24C, and the effect 
of the quantifiability of the future expenditure on the certainty that future 
expenditure will be incurred, will be discussed in chapter 4. 
 
‐ In ITC 1601 the taxpayer’s standard conditions of offer and sale contained 
a warrant against defective workmanship and materials supplied. The 
Commissioner did not allow the section 24C allowance for possible future 
expenditure to be incurred under a warranty in a contract. In ITC 1667 
61 SATC 439 (‘ITC 1667’) the taxpayer rented out equipment under a 
rental contract and he provided, under a separate contract, for the 
maintenance of the equipment during the duration of the rental agreement. 
The Commissioner disallowed the deduction and, inter alia, held that the 
incurral of the maintenance expenditure was conditional upon the client 
using the equipment. 
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The certainty that future expenditure will be incurred under warranty 
contracts and maintenance and repair contracts, will be discussed in 
chapter 4. 
 
‐ Special Board Decision No. 129 dealt with section 24C. The taxpayer sold 
policies and earned commission on all his sales. The taxpayer, however, 
had an obligation to refund the commission if the policies were cancelled 
within two years. The taxpayer estimated his expected obligation to refund 
the commission based on the cancellation history. It was held that the 
amounts that the taxpayer claimed in terms of section 24C did not 
represent an obligation that would definitely be incurred. The amount 
referred to an obligation, which had not yet vested. It was also held that 
the fact that reliable data was available to enable a reasonably accurate 
projection of cancellation figures did not change the character of the 
obligation. The obligation of the taxpayer remained contingent in relation 
to each individual policy. The section 24C allowance was not allowed. 
 
The effect of grouping similar contracts with conditional obligations to 
perform together, in order to determine, based on historical data, the 
certainty that future expenditure will be incurred, will be discussed in 
chapter 4. 
 
 Does IN 78 introduce any new guidelines, addressing the aforementioned research 
questions, and are there any shortcomings to these new guidelines?  
 
IN 78 discusses each requirement of section 24C and provides, inter alia, the 
following new guidelines on the interpretation of section 24C:  
 
 Paragraph 4.2.1(a) of IN 78 states that it is important to distinguish between 
expenditure and losses, because the two are different and section 24C only 
applies to ‘future expenditure’. IN 78 further refers to designed expenditure, 
representing money voluntarily spent and fortuitous expenditure, representing 
‘money involuntarily spent because of some mischance or misfortune which has 
overtaken the taxpayer’.  
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 Paragraph 4.2.1(b) explains the meaning of the phrase ‘will be incurred in a 
subsequent year of assessment’. It states that the Commissioner must be 
satisfied that there is a high degree of probability and inevitability that the 
expenditure will be incurred. There must also be a high degree of certainty that 
the expenditure will be incurred in a subsequent year of assessment.  
 
 Paragraph 4.2.1(b) of IN 78 also addresses the taxpayer’s obligations to 
perform under a contract. It seems that, through IN 78, the Commissioner is 
attempting to limit the application of section 24C to expenditure for which the 
taxpayer has an unconditional contractual obligation, as opposed to a potential 
contractual obligation. According to IN 78, where there is only a potential 
contractual obligation, the degree of certainty required for the deduction to be 
allowed in terms of section 24C is unlikely to be met. IN 78 also states that an 
obligation to perform in terms of a contract will be unconditional where the 
performance of the taxpayer is merely dependent on the client taking action.  
 
In chapter 5 these aforementioned new guidelines, introduced by IN 78, are 
discussed and any shortcomings to these new guidelines are emphasised. 
 
 It is clear from paragraphs 4.2.3, 4.2.5 and 7.1 of IN 78 that SARS is of the 
opinion that trading stock on hand at the end of the year of assessment, which 
will be utilised by a taxpayer in the performance of his obligation under the 
contract, in a subsequent year of assessment, will not be included in the section 
24C allowance as ‘future expenditure’. 
 
Chapter 5.4 discusses the interplay between section 24C and trading stock. 
 
1.4 Research goals 
The aim of this assignment is to address the uncertainties that exist regarding the meaning 
of certain words and phrases used in section 24C, and to determine how a taxpayer will be 
able to prove that he will incur future expenditure in the performance of his obligations 
under a contract. In order to achieve this goal, this study will focus on the following:  
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 To provide a basic understanding of the meaning of the phrases ‘expenditure and 
losses’ and ‘actually incurred’, with reference to its meaning in section 11(a). This will 
serve as a basis from which to determine the meaning of the word ‘expenditure’ and 
the phrase ‘will be incurred’, as used in section 24C. 
 To determine what indicators will serve to demonstrate that future expenditure will be 
incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under the contract.  
This will be done with reference to: 
 The contractual terms in the contract and the effect that they may have on the 
certainty that the taxpayer will perform his obligations under a contact and on 
the certainty of the incurral of the related future expenditure. 
 The circumstances which indicate that there is certainty that the future 
expenditure will be incurred. Specific reference will be made to: 
- The definite connection that must exist between the incurral of future 
expenditure and the obligation to perform under the contract; 
- The contingent liability and the conditional obligation to perform under a 
contract; 
- The quantifiability of the future expenditure; 
- The certainty that future expenditure will be incurred under warranty 
contracts and maintenance and repair contracts; and 
- The effect of grouping similar contracts with conditional obligations to 
perform together, in order to determine, based on historical data, the 
certainty that the future expenditure will be incurred. 
 To identify and discuss any new guidelines, provided for by IN 78 on the 
interpretation of section 24C, which address the aforementioned research goals, and 
to emphasise any shortcomings in these new guidelines. 
 
1.5 Research method  
The research will consist of a literature review of historical data. This will include relevant 
legislation, the Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax and other court cases, Binding 
Private Rulings, IN 78 and the opinions of acknowledged law and tax practitioners. 
Recognised journals and textbooks will also be consulted. 
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1.6 Assumptions and limitations of scope 
 The scope of a deductible amount, in terms of sections 24C(1)(a) and (b), will be 
limited to an amount that is deductible in terms of section 11(a). 
 
 This study will not focus on the calculation of the amount of the allowance deductible 
under section 24C.  
 
 This study is not an in-depth investigation of the Law of Contract. When reference is 
made to a contract or the obligation created to perform in terms of the contract, it will 
be assumed that all the requirements for a valid contract have been met. 
 
1.7 Chapter outline 
Chapter 2 discusses all the elements of section 24C, highlighting the requirements that 
must be met before a taxpayer can apply the section. These are then compared with the 
requirements of section 11(a) to identify similarities and differences between these two 
sections. The meaning of the phrases ‘expenditure and losses’ and ‘actually incurred’, as 
found in section 11(a), are discussed to form a basis for the interpretation of the word 
‘expenditure’ and the phrase ‘will be incurred’, as used in section 24C. This chapter 
concludes on the meaning of the word ‘expenditure’ and the phrase ‘will be incurred’, as 
used in section 24C. 
 
Chapter 3 briefly discusses the burden that rests on the taxpayer to prove to the 
Commissioner that the requirements of section 24C are met. The remainder of the chapter 
focuses on the taxpayer’s obligations to perform under the contract, the performance of 
which must lead to the incurral of future expenditure. The following aspects are addressed: 
the meaning of the words ‘contact’, ‘obligation’ and ‘performance’; the effect of contractual 
terms on the certainty that the taxpayer will perform his obligations under a contact and on 
the certainty of the incurral of the related future expenditure. This will be done to determine 
whether the contractual terms will serve as indicators to demonstrate whether there is 
certainty that the future expenditure will be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of 
his obligations under the contract.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
15 
 
Chapter 4 discusses other circumstances that indicate that future expenditure ‘will be 
incurred’, as required in section 24C. Available Tax Court cases and Binding Private 
Rulings on section 24C are analysed and discussed to determine in which circumstances 
the Commissioner and the Courts were satisfied that there was certainty that future 
expenditure would be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under 
the contract.  
 
In chapter 5, new guidelines provided for by IN 78 are discussed with specific reference to 
the interpretation of the word ‘expenditure’ and any new indicators that can serve to 
demonstrate that future expenditure will be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of 
his obligations under the contract. Shortcomings to these new guidelines are emphasised 
and, if necessary, suggestions regarding these guidelines are provided. Lastly, chapter 5 
discusses the interplay between section 24C and trading stock. 
 
Chapter 6 is the concluding chapter. It contains a summary of the research conducted 
during the study and conclusions on the identified research questions. 
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CHAPTER 2: REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 24C AND SECTION 11(a), THE 
MEANING OF ‘EXPENDITURE’, ‘ACTUALLY INCURRED’ AND ‘WILL BE INCURRED’ 
2.1 Introduction 
Section 24C was inserted into the Act to empower the Commissioner to allow a deduction 
in respect of any amount of income received by or accrued to a taxpayer under a contract, 
which is to be utilised to finance future expenditure in the performance of his obligations 
under such contract. The meaning of the words used by the Legislator in section 24C is 
important when interpreting this section to correctly apply its provisions in the calculation of 
the taxpayer’s taxable income.  
 
In this chapter the basis for the interpretation of words used by the Legislator is briefly 
discussed to form the foundation for the interpretation of the words in section 24C. The 
requirements of section 24C are listed and discussed and subsequently compared with the 
requirements of section 11(a) to identify similarities and differences between these two 
sections. The meaning of the phrases ‘expenditure and losses’ and ‘actually incurred’, as 
found in section 11(a), are discussed to form a basis for the interpretation of the word 
‘expenditure’ and the phrase ‘will be incurred’, as used in section 24C. This chapter 
concludes with the meaning of the word ‘expenditure’ and the phrase ‘will be incurred’, as 
used in section 24C. 
  
2.2 Interpretation of words used by the Legislator 
Owing to the very nature of language, the meaning of words used by the Legislator is often 
not entirely clear (De Koker & Williams, 2011:par 25.1B). When the meaning of words is 
uncertain, judicial decisions are used to clarify the law (Stiglingh et al., 2014:9). When 
interpreting the law, there are two main approaches of interpretation that are applied by 
the courts, namely the literal approach and the contextual approach. 
 
In terms of the literal approach, the interpreter concentrates on the plain language of the 
provision of the Act (De Koker & Williams, 2011:par 25.1A). Nicholas JA held in R Koster & 
Son (Pty) Ltd & Another v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 47 SATC 23 that, when 
interpreting a provision in the Act: 
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[T]he plain meaning of its language must be adopted unless it leads to some 
absurdity, inconsistency, hardship or anomaly which from a consideration of the 
enactment as a whole a court of law is satisfied the Legislature could not have 
intended. (32) 
 
When the literal rule gives rise to absurdity the courts may depart from the effect of the 
ordinary meaning of the word to the extent that is necessary to remove the absurdity and 
to give effect to the intention of the Legislator (De Koker & Williams, 2011:par 25.1B).  
 
In terms of the contextual approach, the purpose of the legislation is determined by taking 
all the surrounding circumstances and resources into account (Stiglingh et al., 2014:11). 
From as early as 1560, the courts have stated that, when determining the meaning of an 
enactment, the significance of ‘the purpose’ is regarded as being of greater importance 
than the actual letter of the language used (Kellaway, 1995:68). 
 
Section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (‘the 
Constitution’) determines that every court must promote the spirit, purport and objectives 
of the Bill of Rights when interpreting legislation. This is an indication that the contextual 
approach must be followed when interpreting legislation, including the Income Tax Act in 
South Africa (Stiglingh et al., 2014:11). According to Mdumbe (2004:481), when 
interpreting legislation, the starting point remains reading the text. The courts should, 
however, not confine themselves to the wording of the text. The broader context of the 
legislation should be consulted in order to establish its purpose, even if the words that 
have been used by the legislature are clear and unambiguous (Mdumbe, 2004:481). 
 
Following the aforementioned, a contextual approach will be followed when interpreting 
section 24C. The text will be read to gain an understanding of the meaning of the words 
used by the Legislator. The plain and ordinary meaning of the words will be used, unless it 
is evident that this is in conflict with the intention of the Legislator. Further insight into the 
purpose of section 24C will be gained from the Explanatory Memorandum on section 24C. 
The purpose of the Explanatory Memorandum is to provide the background, reasons 
for and details of proposed amendments to legislation (SARS, 2014(2)). Therefore, the 
Explanatory Memorandum is incorporated when determining the meaning of the words 
and phrases used in section 24C.  
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2.3 Section 24C 
Section 24C consists of three sub-sections. Section 24C(1) contains the requirements of 
the phrase ‘future expenditure’. Section 24C(2) contains the requirements that must be 
met before the section 24C allowance will be permitted. Section 24C(3) specifies how the 
allowance that has been granted in a specific year of assessment should be treated in the 
following year of assessment. Refer to Annexure A for the actual text of section 24C.  
 
In 2.3.1 – 2.3.3 the requirements, as contained in each sub-section of section 24C, are 
listed. Key words and phrases used by the Legislator in each requirement are then 
discussed. Words and phrases of which the meaning is unclear will be highlighted for 
further discussion in this assignment.  
 
2.3.1 Requirements of section 24C(1) 
Section 24C(1) defines ‘future expenditure’ in relation to any year of assessment. The 
future expenditure under contention must meet the following three requirements: 
 
 There must be an amount of expenditure. 
 
Although section 24C(1) defines ‘future expenditure’, the word ‘expenditure’ itself is 
not defined in section 24C or in the Act. It is important to know which amounts are 
included in the meaning of the word ‘expenditure’. The word ‘expenditure’ is 
discussed in 2.5. 
 
 The Commissioner must be satisfied that the amount will be incurred after the end of 
such year of assessment. 
 
According to section 24C(1), the Commissioner has the discretion to decide whether 
the expenditure will be incurred after the end of the year of assessment. The burden 
to prove to the Commissioner that the requirements of section 24C are met is 
discussed in chapter 3. 
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The phrase ‘will be incurred’ is used in conjunction with ‘after the end of such year of 
assessment’. It, therefore, indicates when the expenditure must be incurred. The 
word ‘incurred’ is, however, not defined in the Act and is discussed in 2.6. 
 
The phrase ‘such year of assessment’ refers to the year of assessment in which the 
taxpayer received the income from the contract and in which the section 24C 
allowance will be deducted. The incurral of the expenditure under contention must, 
therefore, be after the end of the year of assessment in which the income in terms of 
the contract is received or accrues or, otherwise stated, in a subsequent year of 
assessment. Hereafter, reference will only be made to a subsequent year of 
assessment. It follows that ‘future expenditure’ refers to expenditure that will be 
incurred in a subsequent year of assessment. A ‘year of assessment’ is defined in 
the Act and, inter alia, means any year or other period in respect of which any tax or 
duty leviable under the Act is chargeable.  
 
 The amount of expenditure must meet either the requirement of section 24C(1)(a) or 
the requirement of section 24C(1)(b).  
 
Section 24C(1)(a) determines that the amount of expenditure must be allowable as a 
deduction from income in a subsequent year of assessment. Section 24C(1)(a), 
therefore, does not limit the scope of the deductible expenditure to a specific 
provision in the Act. An example under section 24C(1)(a) would be future salaries 
and wages to be paid in the performance of a trading contract (Meyerowitz, 2008:12-
41). 
 
Section 24C(1)(b) determines that the amount of expenditure must be in respect of 
the acquisition of any asset in respect of which any deduction will be admissible 
under the provisions of the Act. An example of section 24C(1)(b) expenditure would 
be the future purchase of capital assets, for example machinery and equipment, 
which will be used by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under the 
contract1. 
                                             
1 For the purposes of this assignment, the scope of a deductible amount in terms of sections 24C(1)(a) 
and (b) will be limited to an amount that is deductible in terms of section 11(a). 
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2.3.2 Requirements of section 24C(2) 
Section 24C(2) provides that the following three requirements must be met in order to 
utilise the section 24C allowance: 
 
 The income of any taxpayer, in any year of assessment, includes or consists of an 
amount received by or accrued to him in terms of any contract. 
 
The word ‘income’ is defined in section 1 of the Act as the amount remaining of 
‘gross income’ after the deduction of exempt income. Section 24C will, therefore, only 
be applicable if the taxpayer has already included in the calculation of his taxable 
income an amount received that meets the definition of ‘gross income’, as provided in 
section 1, and provided that this amount is not exempt income in terms of the Act.  
 
The meaning of the words ‘received by or accrued to’ has been determined in case 
law. The current legal position indicates that ‘received by’ means the taxpayer’s 
intention was to receive an amount for his own benefit (Stiglingh et al., 2014:21). 
‘Accrued to’ means that the taxpayer must be entitled to an amount (Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue v People’s Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd, 52 SATC 9).  
 
A ‘contract’ can be defined as an agreement which creates an obligation between the 
parties of the agreement (Sharrock, 2007:3). Although a contract must exist before 
section 24C will apply, the form and the nature of the contract in terms of which the 
income was received, are immaterial (Davis, Olivier & Urquhart, 2013:24C-2). The 
contact is discussed in further detail in chapter 3. 
 
 The Commissioner is satisfied that such amount will be utilised in whole or in part to 
finance future expenditure. 
 
The phrase ‘such amount’ refers to the income received by or accrued to the 
taxpayer from the contract. The taxpayer must utilise, in whole or in part, this income 
to finance the future expenditure. A definite connection must accordingly exist 
between the income and the future expenditure that will be incurred by the taxpayer. 
This matter is further discussed in 2.4.2. 
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 Such future expenditure will be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his 
obligations under such contract. 
 
In section 24C the phrase ‘will be incurred’ is used in conjunction with the phrase ‘in 
the performance of the taxpayer’s obligations under the contract’. The meaning of the 
phrase ‘will be incurred’ is discussed in 2.7. The interplay between the incurral of the 
expenditure and the taxpayer’s obligations to perform under the contract is discussed 
in chapter 3. 
 
‘Such contract’ refers to the contract in terms of which the taxpayer received or 
accrued the income. The deduction for the section 24C allowance is, therefore, only 
available if the obligations to perform arise under the same contract as the contract 
from which the income, that must be utilised to finance the future expenditure, was 
received (Davis et al., 2013:24C-2). This was demonstrated in ITC 1667 which dealt 
with the section 24C deduction. The taxpayer’s business was the selling, letting and 
repairing of office equipment. The section 24C allowance was not allowed because 
the income was not received in terms of the same contract which determined the 
obligation of the taxpayer to incur future expenditure. The taxpayer contested that, 
although he received the income under a different contract than the contract that 
obligated him to perform, the income transaction formed an integral part of the 
scheme that obligated him to incur expenditure in the performance of his obligation. 
The court held that the Legislator did not use the words transaction or scheme in 
section 24C, but that the operative concept was a ‘contract’. Accordingly, it was held 
that the requirements of section 24C(2) had not been met since the income was not 
received from the same contract which determined the taxpayer’s obligation to 
perform. 
 
Section 24C(2) determines that the Commissioner has the discretion to decide whether the 
aforementioned requirements of section 24C(2) are met and whether he will allow the 
deduction. If the requirements are met, the allowance is an amount equal to so much of 
the future expenditure as the Commissioner may determine relates to the amount included 
in the taxpayer’s income. This implies that the Commissioner also has the discretion to 
determine the amount of the deduction. Section 24C(2) also specifies that the amount of 
the deduction allowed may not exceed the amount included in the income of the taxpayer 
in terms of the contract.  
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2.3.3 Requirements of section 24C(3) 
Section 24C(3) determines that: 
 
 The amount of any allowance deducted under section 24C(2) in any year of 
assessment shall be deemed to be income received by or accrued to the taxpayer in 
the following year of assessment. 
 
‘Income’ consists of gross income less exempt income. Specific inclusion (n) of the 
‘gross income’ definition in section 1 of the Act includes in ‘gross income’ any amount 
which must be included in the taxpayer’s income in terms of any other provision of 
the Act. Such amounts are deemed to be received by, or to have accrued to, the 
taxpayer. The amounts deducted in terms of section 24C(2) will, therefore, be 
deemed to be income received by the taxpayer in the subsequent year of 
assessment.  
 
According to Clegg and Stretch (2011:par 11.11.7), the fact that the allowance is 
deemed to be income received by or accrued to the taxpayer in the next year of 
assessment does not mean that in the next year of assessment it will be income from 
a contract, as required by section 24C(2). It is, however, the practice of SARS to deal 
with this deemed income as if it were income from a contract (Clegg & Stretch, 
2011:par 11.11.7). The effect is that in the following year of assessment, the taxpayer 
will have ‘income’ received by or accrued to him from a contract and the  
section 24C(2) allowance can again be utilised against this income, provided all the 
other requirements of section 24C are met.  
 
2.4 Section 11(a) 
Section 11 only permits for deductions if the taxpayer carries on any trade. Section 11(a) is 
the so-called general deduction formula. When an amount meets the requirements of this 
section, it will be allowed as a deduction in the calculation of taxable income, except if the 
deduction is prohibited by any other provision of the Act. In relation to section 24C, it is 
submitted that, if an amount will be deductible under section 11(a) in a subsequent year of 
assessment, and the amount meets the requirements of sections 24C(1) and (2) in the 
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current year, a deduction for the future expenditure will be allowed in terms of section 24C 
in the current year of assessment. 
 
This assignment will not discuss all the requirements of section 11(a) in detail. The 
requirements of section 11(a) and section 24C are, however, listed and compared in  
Table 2.1. The similarities and differences between these sections are identified in 2.4.2. 
This serves to illustrate that the word ‘expenditure’ and the phrase ‘actually incurred’ used 
in section 11(a) can contribute to an understanding of the word ‘expenditure’ and the 
phrase ‘will be incurred’, as used in section 24C.  
 
2.4.1 Comparison between the requirements of section 11(a) and sections 24C(1) 
and (2) 
Table 2.1  A schematic comparison of the requirements of section 11(a) and 
sections 24C(1) and (2) 
Section 11(a) Section 24C(2) 
 For the purpose of determining the 
taxable income derived by any person 
from carrying on any trade, there shall 
be allowed as deductions from the 
income of such person: 
 There shall be deducted in the 
determination of the taxpayer’s taxable 
income for such year such allowance 
(not exceeding the said amount) as the 
Commissioner may determine, in 
respect of so much of such future 
expenditure as in his opinion relates to 
the said amount:  
(The ‘said amount’ refers to the income 
received by the taxpayer in terms of a 
contract.) 
Requirements that must be met: 
  If the income of any taxpayer, in any 
year of assessment, includes or 
consists of an amount received by or 
accrued to him in terms of any contract; 
and 
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 the Commissioner is satisfied that such 
amount will be utilised in whole or in 
part to finance 
 expenditure and losses  future expenditure 
 actually incurred  which will be incurred 
 in the production of income  by the taxpayer in the performance of 
his obligations under such contract. 
 Section 24C(1) 
 incurred during the year of assessment 
Concentra (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue 12 SATC 95 
(‘Concentra (Pty) Ltd v CIR’) 
 Future expenditure (as defined in 
sections 24C(1)(a) and (b) in relation to 
any year of assessment means an 
amount of expenditure which the Com-
missioner is satisfied will be incurred 
after the end of such year.  
 provided the expenditure and losses are 
not of a capital nature. 
 
 
2.4.2  Similarities and differences between the requirements of section 11(a) and 
sections 24C(1) and (2) 
The comparison in Table 2.1 reveals the following similarities and differences between the 
requirements of section 11(a) and sections 24C(1) and (2): 
 
 Section 11(a) uses the phrase ‘expenditure and losses’. Sections 24C(1) and (2) use 
the phrase ‘future expenditure’ and no reference is made to the word losses. The 
word expenditure is, therefore, used in both sections. The meaning of the phrase 
‘expenditure and losses’ has been defined in case law. The meaning of the word 
‘expenditure’, as used in section 24C, is discussed in 2.5 with reference to the 
meaning of the phrase ‘expenditure and losses’, as used in section 11(a). 
 
 Section 11(a) refers to expenditure and losses ‘actually incurred’. Section 24C(1) and 
section 24C(2) refer to expenditure that ‘will be incurred’. Both section 11(a) and 
sections 24C(1) and (2), therefore, refer to the incurral of expenditure. The meaning 
of the phrase ‘actually incurred’ and the word ‘incurred’ have been defined in case 
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law and this is discussed in 2.6 to form a basis for the interpretation of the phrase 
‘will be incurred’, as used in section 24C. 
 
 Section 11(a) refers to expenditure and losses actually incurred ‘in the production of 
income’. Section 24C(2) refers to future expenditure which will be incurred by the 
taxpayer ‘in the performance of his obligations under a contract’. Both these sections, 
therefore, qualify the incurral of the expenditure in relation to a specific requirement. 
The qualification for section 11(a), namely that expenditure must be incurred in the 
production of income, was addressed in PE Electric Tramway Co Ltd v CIR. It was 
determined that the action that gives rise to the expenditure must be closely 
connected with the income-earning activities.  
 
In section 24C(2) the phrase will be incurred forms the connection between the future 
expenditure and the taxpayer’s performance of his obligations under a contract. The 
words ‘will’ and ‘shall’ are used interchangeably in the English language (The Oxford 
English Dictionary (‘OED’), 2014:shall). In addition, the word ‘shall’ is often used as 
an equivalent to ‘must’ (Clegg & Stretch, 2011:par 2.9). It is, therefore, submitted that 
the word ‘will’, as part of the phrase ‘will be incurred’, indicates that future 
expenditure must be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations 
under a contract. A definite connection is, therefore, created between the incurral of 
the future expenditure and the taxpayer’s performance of his obligations under a 
contract. The qualification for section 24C, namely that the future expenditure will be 
incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under a contract, will 
be addressed in further detail in chapter 3.  
 
 In Concentra (Pty) Ltd v CIR it was determined that the expenditure and losses 
actually incurred in terms of section 11(a) are restricted to those actually incurred 
during the year of assessment. Section 11(a), therefore, limits the incurral of the 
expenditure and losses to the current year of assessment. Section 24C(1) refers to 
the incurral of the expenditure in a subsequent year of assessment. Therefore, 
although both the deductions under section 11(a) and section 24C are allowed in the 
current year of assessment, the expenditure is incurred in different years of 
assessment. It is, therefore, firstly important to determine whether there is, or will be, 
an incurral of expenditure and then to establish in which year of assessment the 
incurral takes effect. The indicators that serve to demonstrate that expenditure is 
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incurred are discussed in 2.6 and the meaning of ‘will be incurred’ is addressed in 
2.7.  
 
To summarise, the meaning of the phrases ‘expenditure and losses’ and ‘actually 
incurred’, as used in section 11(a), has been determined in authoritative case law. An 
understanding of the meaning of these phrases, as determined by the courts, and with 
specific reference to the words ‘expenditure’ and ‘incurred’, as used in section 11(a), can 
provide guidance as to the meaning of the word ‘expenditure’ and the phrase ‘will be 
incurred’, as used in section 24C.  
 
2.4.3 The interplay between section 11(a) and section 24C 
The interplay between section 11(a) and section 24C can be explained as follows: 
 
A taxpayer receives income under a contract during the current year of assessment. The 
taxpayer will incur expenditure in the performance of his obligation under the contract. If 
the expenditure under the contract is actually incurred in the current year of assessment 
and the requirements of section 11(a) are met, the expenditure will be deductible in terms 
of section 11(a) in the current year of assessment. If the expenditure in terms of the 
contract is not yet actually incurred, as required by section 11(a), it will not be deductible 
under section 11(a). However, if the taxpayer can prove that the expenditure will be 
incurred in a subsequent year of assessment and all the other requirements of section 24C 
are met, the Commissioner will allow the section 24C allowance in the current year of 
assessment.  
 
It is important to note that, when discussing section 11(a), there are deductions that are 
specifically prohibited by section 23 of the Act. One of these prohibitions is section 23(e), 
which states that no deduction shall be allowed where income is carried to any reserve 
fund or capitalised in any way. This provision will prohibit a deduction of contingent or 
anticipated liabilities which have not actually been incurred (Meyerowitz, 2008:11-6). There 
are, however, specific exceptions to section 23(e) and one of these exceptions is provided 
by section 24C, which permits for the deduction of future expenditure on contracts  
(De Koker & Williams, 2011:par 7.47). If the requirements of section 24C are met, the 
prohibition in terms of section 23(e) will not apply. The interplay between section 24C and 
section 23(e) is discussed further in chapter 4.2.2.2. 
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2.5 The meaning of the word ‘expenditure’, as used in section 24C 
As mentioned in the discussion of the requirements of section 24C (2.3.1), the meaning of 
the word ‘expenditure’ is not defined in the Act. The meaning of the word ‘expenditure’ with 
relation to section 24C was, however, addressed in ITC 1739. The taxpayer was a 
manufacturer of certain products (held as trading stock) which were sold with a 
manufacturer’s warranty to various motor assembly plants. The motor assembly plants are 
referred to as original equipment manufacturers (‘OEM’). The OEM, in turn, supplied 
completed vehicles to dealers and distributors. In the event of a warranty claim, the OEM 
would claim the parts necessary for the repair of the vehicle from the taxpayer. The 
taxpayer wanted to utilise the section 24C allowance. He argued that, when determining 
the price for his products he, inter alia, considers the terms of the manufacturer’s warranty 
since, in the event of a claim, he will incur a cost to honour his obligation under the 
warranty contract. The Commissioner disallowed the taxpayer’s claim on the basis that it 
was a warranty claim and, therefore, a contingent liability2. The taxpayer appealed to the 
court. The court did not address the matter of a contingent liability, but disallowed the 
appeal based on the fact that the taxpayer incurred a loss, as opposed to expenditure. The 
court held that, in honouring his obligation, the taxpayer incurred a loss when he supplied 
parts from his trading stock to replace the defective parts.  
 
An evaluative commentary on ITC 1739 was subsequently given by JutaLaw (Case no. 
10723). It states that the cost incurred by the taxpayer to manufacture the trading stock 
represents expenditure. It is, however, effectively not yet deducted for tax purposes at the 
end of the year of assessment since section 22(1) provides that the value of closing 
trading stock held at year end must be included in the calculation of the taxable income of 
the taxpayer. According to JutaLaw, based on the aforementioned, there is scope for a 
view that when the manufacturer uses this trading stock to meet his warranty obligation in 
a subsequent year of assessment, he will incur ‘future expenditure’3.  
 
                                             
2 The Commissioner’s argument that a warranty contract represents a contingent liability will be discussed in 
chapter 4.  
3 Whether closing stock on hand can be included as ‘future expenditure’ in terms of section 24C will be 
discussed in further detail in chapter 5.4.  
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There are, accordingly, different opinions as to what comprises future expenditure. It is 
submitted that the ruling in ITC 1739 implies that the word ‘expenditure’ in section 24C 
does not include a reference to losses and section 24C, therefore, excludes a deduction 
for future losses. JutaLaw is, however, of the opinion that, because the taxpayer incurs 
costs to manufacture the trading stock, it is expenditure and should, therefore, be included 
in the meaning of the word ‘expenditure’, as used in section 24C.  
 
It follows that there are two questions which must be addressed, namely: What is the 
meaning of the word ‘expenditure’ and does the word ‘expenditure’, as used in  
section 24C, include a reference to a loss? These two questions are now discussed with 
reference to case law and the Explanatory Memorandum on section 24C. 
 
2.5.1 The meaning of the word ‘expenditure’ with reference to case law 
The meaning of ‘expenditure’ was determined in Commissioner for South African Revenue 
Service v Labat Africa Ltd 74 SATC 1 (‘C:SARS v Labat Africa Ltd’). In this case, the court 
had to decide whether the issue of a company’s own shares in consideration for the 
acquisition of a trademark constituted ‘expenditure actually incurred’, as required in  
section 11(gA) of the Act. Harms AP held that:  
 
The term ‘expenditure’ is not defined in the Act and since it is an ordinary 
English word and, unless the context indicates otherwise, this meaning must be 
attributed to it. Its ordinary meaning refers to the action of spending funds; 
disbursement or consumption; and hence the amount of money spent. In the 
context of the Act it would also include the disbursement of other assets with a 
monetary value. Expenditure, accordingly, requires a diminution (even if only 
temporary) or at the very least movement of assets of the person who expends. 
This does not mean that the taxpayer will, at the end of the day, be poorer 
because the value of the counter-performance may be the same or even more 
than the value expended. (6) (own emphasis)  
 
Thus, according to this judgement by Harms AP, the word ‘expenditure’ refers to an 
amount of money spent or the disbursement of other assets of the taxpayer with a 
monetary value. Meyerowitz (2008: 11-13) also confirms that expenditure may take on any 
form that has a value in monetary terms and can include cash, but is not limited to cash.  
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The meaning of the word ‘expenditure’ was also discussed in Joffe & Co (Pty) Ltd v CIR. 
The taxpayer was an engineering company. The negligence of the company caused the 
death of an employee which lead to the incurral of legal expenditure and the company had 
to pay damage compensation. The question before the court was whether this expenditure 
could be allowed as a deduction under section 11(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act No 31 of 
1941. The context of section 11(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act No. 31 of 1941 was almost 
identical to the context of section 11(a) in the Act (Stiglingh et al., 2014:139). In section 
11(a), the word ‘expenditure’ is used in conjunction with the word ‘losses’. The company 
contested that the damage compensation payments and the legal cost were either 
expenditure or losses. Watermeyer CJ held that the word ‘loss’ has several meanings and 
that its meaning in section 11(2)(a) was somewhat obscure. Watermeyer CJ stated that, in 
relation to trading operations, expenditure usually means the voluntary payment of money, 
whereas losses is sometimes used to signify a deprivation suffered by the loser, usually an 
involuntary deprivation. Watermeyer CJ continued with an explanation of his argument:  
 
[W]hen trading operations cause damage to third parties and this damage has 
to be made good, then the payment which is made in satisfaction of such 
damage may properly be called a loss, but when the payment has been made 
then it can also properly be called an expenditure. (360) 
 
Watermeyer CJ highlighted the voluntary nature of expenditure and the involuntary nature 
of losses, and, in the case of payments for damages, he equated the words ‘loss’ and 
‘expenditure’.  
 
According to Haupt (2012:118), it is not certain whether there actually is a difference 
between these words. Haupt also stated, with reference to section 11(a), that if a 
distinction does exist, it is not an important problem when determining whether an amount 
is deductible. This is because both the ‘expenditure’ and ‘loss’ are deductible under  
section 11(a), provided the other requirements of section 11(a) are met. It, therefore, 
appears that for section 11(a) the difference between the words ‘expenditure’ and ‘losses’ 
is of no particular importance.  
 
Section 24C, however, only refers to ‘expenditure’ and does not specifically include 
‘losses’. According to Davis et al. (2013:11(a)-6) the rules of interpretation of statutes 
stipulate that each word in a statute should be ascribed a specific meaning and that the 
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word ‘expenditure’ should, therefore, mean something different compared to the word 
‘losses’. For the purpose of section 24C, a distinction between ‘expenditure’ and ‘losses’ 
is, therefore, important since only the word ‘expenditure’ is used in this section.  
 
The statement of Watermeyer CJ, that in relation to trading operations, expenditure usually 
means the voluntary payment of money, can assist with the interpretation of the meaning 
of ‘expenditure’, as used in section 24C. According to the OED (2014:voluntary), the word 
voluntary refers to:  
 
An action performed or done of one's own free will, impulse, or choice; not 
constrained, prompted, or suggested by another. Sometimes denoting ‘left to 
choice’, ‘not required or demanded of one’. 
 
In light of the aforementioned it is, therefore, submitted that, when interpreting section 
24C, if a taxpayer becomes a party to a contract by his own choice and he agrees to 
spend money or to disburse some of his assets in the performance of his obligations under 
the contract, it will be regarded as ‘expenditure’. 
 
2.5.2 The meaning of the word ‘expenditure’ with reference to the Explanatory 
Memorandum on section 24C 
According to the Explanatory Memorandum, section 24C empowers the Commissioner to 
make a deduction, by way of a reserve, in respect of any amount received under a 
contract, which is to be utilised to finance future expenditure. The Explanatory 
Memorandum does not provide any additional explanation for the meaning of the word 
‘expenditure’ and does not limit the use of the word ‘expenditure’ in any way. Therefore, it 
is clear that the Explanatory Memorandum does not expand on the understanding of the 
meaning of the word ‘expenditure’, as used in section 24C. 
 
2.5.3 Conclusion on the meaning of the word ‘expenditure’, as used in section 24C 
Section 24C only uses the word ‘expenditure’ and, accordingly, excludes the word ‘loss’. 
Section 24C(1) determines that the ‘expenditure’ must be deductible in terms of a 
provision in the Act in a subsequent year of assessment or that it must be in respect of the 
acquisition of any asset for which any deduction will be admissible under the provisions of 
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the Act. It follows that if the amount under contention ascribes to the meaning of 
expenditure, as defined by the courts, and all the other requirements in terms of  
section 24C are met, it is deductible under section 24C. 
 
There are two matters regarding the meaning of the word expenditure, as used in  
section 24C, which require conclusion:  
 
 What is the meaning of the word ‘expenditure’? 
 
It is submitted that the meaning of the word ‘expenditure’ in section 24C should be 
determined with reference to its ordinary meaning, as held by Harms AP in C:SARS v 
Labat Africa Ltd, as the amount of money spent, including the disbursement of other 
assets with a monetary value.  
 
It follows, with reference to the argument by Watermeyer CJ in Joffe & Co (Pty) Ltd v 
CIR, that the word ‘expenditure’, as used in section 24C, will include, inter alia, a 
voluntary payment of money by the taxpayer and the voluntary disbursement of the 
taxpayer’s assets. It is submitted that if a taxpayer by his own choice agrees 
contractually to the incurral of expenditure in terms of a contract from which he 
receives income, the incurral of such amounts will constitute voluntary payments and 
will, therefore, qualify as ‘expenditure’. 
 
Following the aforementioned and in the light of JutaLaw’s commentary on ITC 1739 
it is further submitted that if a taxpayer will utilise his trading stock in the performance 
of his obligation under the contract, the trading stock will be ‘expenditure’, as it forms 
part of the taxpayer’s assets. However, before the section 24C allowance will be 
allowed, all the requirements of section 24C must be met, which inter alia includes 
that it must be future expenditure. This will be discussed further in chapter 5.4. 
 
 Does the word ‘expenditure’, as used in section 24C, include a reference to a loss? 
 
It is submitted with reference to the argument by Watermeyer CJ in Joffe & Co (Pty) 
Ltd v CIR, that, if a loss can be equated with the meaning of the word ‘expenditure’, 
then the loss will be deductible as ‘expenditure’, in terms of section 24C, provided all 
other requirements are met.  
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If a loss cannot be equated with the meaning of the word ‘expenditure’, uncertainty 
remains as to whether it is deductible in terms of section 24C4. It is, however, 
submitted that the fact that the text of section 24C does not include the word ‘loss’ 
might be an indication that, if a loss cannot be equated with the meaning of the word 
‘expenditure’, it will not be deductible in terms of section 24C. 
 
2.6 The meaning of ‘actually incurred’ and ‘incurred’ 
Both section 24C and section 11(a) contain the word ‘incurred’. Section 11(a) provides for 
a deduction of expenditure and losses actually incurred in the production of income, 
provided it is not capital in nature. Although the meaning of the phrase ‘actually incurred’ in 
section 11(a) is not defined in the Act, the meaning of ‘actually incurred’ and ‘incurred’ has 
been determined by case law. The meaning of ‘actually incurred’ and ‘incurred’, as used in 
section 11(a), can, therefore, form a basis for determining the meaning of the phrase ‘will 
be incurred’, as used in section 24C. 
 
It is important to note that, when discussing section 11(a), it is accepted that, although the 
section does not state that the expenditure and losses should be actually incurred during 
the year of assessment, it is a requirement implicit in the Act itself. Actually incurred 
should, therefore, be read in conjunction with during the year of assessment.   
  
The meaning of actually incurred is discussed with reference to: 
 
 The terminology used in case law.  
 The difference between actually incurred and incurred. 
 Case law on the meaning of actually incurred and incurred. 
           
2.6.1 Terminology used in case law 
In determining the meaning of actually incurred, the courts have used several descriptive 
words to explain their interpretation of ‘actually incurred’. These cases are discussed in 
2.6.3. The following words and phrases have, inter alia, been used by the courts in case 
law concerning the meaning of actually incurred:  
                                             
4 No further research will be done on this matter in this assignment and it is, therefore, an aspect that 
remains to be decided by authoritative case law. 
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 Liability / liability to pay / legally liable to pay / definite and absolute liability / absolute 
and unqualified legal liability 
 Contingent liability  
 Obligation / obligation to pay / unconditional legal obligation 
 Unconditional legal liability  
 
Although it might appear that there are different interpretations to the meaning of actually 
incurred, many of these descriptive words are substitutes for each other. The correlation 
between the following words is briefly discussed with reference to their meaning in the 
OED (2014) and Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary (Bird, 1983): 
 
 Liability, liable and obligation 
 Contingent, conditional and condition 
 Unconditional obligation and contingent liability.  
 
Liability (noun) 
 The condition of being liable or answerable by law or equity (OED, 2014:liability 
- Law). (own emphasis) 
 
 Subjection to legal obligation; or the obligation itself. He who commits a wrong 
or breaks a contract or trust is said to be liable or responsible for it. Liability is 
civil or criminal according to whether it is enforced by the civil or criminal courts. 
(Bird, 1983:liability). (own emphasis) 
 
Liable (adjective) 
 Bound or obliged by law or equity, or in accordance with a rule or convention; 
answerable; legally subject or amenable to (OED, 2014:liable - Law). (own 
emphasis) 
 The one who incurs legal liability (Bird, 1983:liable). 
 
Obligation (noun) 
 A binding agreement committing a person to a payment or other action; the 
document containing such an agreement; a written contract or bond. Also: the 
right created or liability incurred by such an agreement, document, or bond; the 
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duty of a borrower to repay a loan. Now chiefly superseded by contract (OED, 
2014:obligation - Law and Finance). (own emphasis) 
 
 A duty: the bond of legal necessity which binds together two or more 
determinate individuals. It is limited to legal duties arising out of a special 
personal relationship existing between them, whether by reason of a contract or 
a tort, or otherwise, e.g. debtor and creditor. See LIABILITY (Bird, 
1983:obligation). (own emphasis) 
 
From the above definitions of the nouns ‘liability’ and ‘obligation’, it is clear that they can be 
used as substitutes for each other since an ‘obligation’ refers to a liability incurred (OED, 
2014:obligation) and a ‘liability’ refers to an obligation itself (Bird, 1983:liability). This is 
also confirmed in Ackermans Ltd v C:SARS, where it was held that: 
 
‘[E]xpenditure incurred’ means the undertaking of an obligation to pay or (which 
amounts to the same thing) the actual incurring of a liability. (5) (own emphasis) 
 
Contingent (adjective) 
 Dependent on a pre-contemplated probability; provisionally liable to exist or take 
effect; conditional; not absolute (OED, 2014:contingent - Law). (own emphasis) 
 
 That which waits or depends on the happening of an event (Bird, 
1983:contingent). 
 
 A contingent liability is a future unascertained obligation (Bird, 1983:liability). 
(own emphasis) 
 
Conditional (adjective) 
 Subject to, depending on, or limited by, one or more conditions; not absolute; 
made or granted on certain terms or stipulations (OED, 2014:conditional). (own 
emphasis) 
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Condition (noun)  
 A provision which makes the existence of a right dependent on the happening 
of an event; the right is then conditional, as opposed to an absolute right. A true 
condition is where the event on which the existence of the right depends is 
future and uncertain (Bird, 1983:condition). (own emphasis) 
 
From the above definitions of the words ‘contingent’, ‘conditional’ and ‘condition’ it is clear 
that the adjectives ‘contingent’ and ‘conditional’ can be used as substitutes for each other 
as ‘contingent’ is also described as conditional or not absolute (OED, 2014:contingent) or 
dependent upon the happening of an event (Bird, 1983:contingent). ‘Conditional’ is further 
also described as not absolute (OED, 2014:conditional) and dependent upon the 
happening of a future and uncertain event (Bird, 1983:condition).  
 
Unconditional obligation and contingent liability  
According to The Opposite Dictionary (2014), the opposite word for ‘unconditional’ is 
conditional. Since ‘conditional’ and ‘contingent’ can be used as substitutes for each other, 
they are both opposites for ‘unconditional’. ‘Obligation’ and ‘liability’ are also substitutes for 
each other. The opposite of an ‘unconditional obligation’ can, therefore, be called a 
‘contingent liability’5. A contingent liability is a future unascertained obligation (Bird, 
1983:liability). 
 
In summary, it is submitted that, in the context of section 11(a) and with reference to the 
meaning of actually incurred, 
 
 liability and obligation are substitutes for each other; and 
 contingent and conditional are substitutes for each other; and 
 contingent and conditional are the opposite of unconditional; and 
 an unconditional obligation is the opposite of a contingent liability. 
 
This terminology will also be used in chapter 3, where the taxpayer’s obligation to perform 
in terms of a contract is discussed.  
                                             
5 The phrase contingent liability is used in Income Tax cases on section 24C. Since case law on the meaning 
of ‘actually incurred’ in section 11(a) is used to determine the meaning of ‘will be incurred’ in section 24C, the 
correlation between these phrases, as used in case law on section 11(a) and section 24C respectively, is 
established.  
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2.6.2 ‘Actually incurred’ versus ‘incurred’ 
Section 11(a) refers to ‘actually incurred’ and not only ‘incurred’. According to Davis et al. 
(2013:11(a)-11), it is difficult to understand the difference between when expenditure is 
incurred and when it is actually incurred. It is, however, a rule of interpretation that every 
word in a statute should be given a meaning and should not be regarded as superfluous, 
void or insignificant (Kellaway, 1995:92).  
 
According to The Oxford English Dictionary (2014) the adverb actually means: 
 
In action; in fact, in reality, really. Opposed to: possibly, potentially, theoretically. 
 
If these words are used in section 11(a) as a substitute for actually, section 11(a) would 
read as follows: 
 
 Expenditure and losses really / in fact / in reality incurred during the year of 
assessment. 
 
In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd 55 SATC 198 (‘CIR v 
Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd’) a former employee of the taxpayer brought a claim against the 
taxpayer for the delivery of shares as compensation for work done by the employee in 
terms of a contract. At the end of the year of assessment the claim was still in dispute. The 
court held that where there is a dispute regarding a liability, the liability is contingent and 
the expenditure and losses are, therefore, not deductible in the year of assessment.  
 
In considering whether the expenditure was actually incurred, Nicholas AJA, inter alia, held 
that it cannot be suggested that the Legislator used the word actually through inadvertence 
or error. On p 205 Nicholas AJA referred to an unreported judgement by Watermeyer, then 
president of the Special Court for Income Tax Appeals, in the Jacobsohn’s case (circa 
1923), where it was held that: 
 
The phrase ‘actually incurred’ here in our opinion means no more than that the 
loss must be an ascertained loss in the year of assessment: the word ‘actually’ 
does not push the meaning of ‘incurred’ further so as to give it the sense 
‘realised in cash’ as contended by the Commissioner. (own emphasis) 
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It, therefore, seems that the word ‘actually’ ascribes certainty to the fact that the 
expenditure has been incurred during the year of assessment, as opposed to it only being 
possibly incurred. 
 
2.6.3 Case law on the meaning of ‘actually incurred’ and ‘incurred’ 
In this section the case law in which the meanings of actually incurred and incurred were 
addressed will be discussed in chronological order, as some of the latter court cases refer 
to previous judgements to support their arguments. Some of the court cases also discuss 
indicators that will serve to demonstrate that the expenditure is not yet actually incurred. 
 
 Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co Ltd v CIR dealt with the deductibility of damage 
compensation in terms of section 11(2) of the Income Tax Act 40 of 1925, which was 
a similar provision to section 11(a) of the Act. Watermeyer AJP held that expenditure 
‘actually incurred’ cannot mean actually paid. He held that, as long as there is a 
liability to pay, the expenditure has been actually incurred and the expenditure is 
deductible. 
 
 ITC 542 13 SATC 116 (‘ITC 542’) dealt with the deductibility of interest on loans by 
directors in terms of section 11(2) of the Income Tax Act 31 of 1941. In this case, 
Nathan K.C. stated that it was not necessary to further explore the meaning of 
‘actually incurred’. He held that ‘incurred’ means either ‘paid’ or ‘become liable for’. In 
ITC 542 reference was also made to a previous unreported case (Case 1877) where 
it was held that the words ‘expenditure actually incurred’ seems to mean:  
(1) moneys actually paid out; or (2) moneys which a trader is legally liable to pay. 
 
 Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue 37 SATC 1 (‘Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v 
SIR’) was a court case on the deductibility of expenditure in terms of section 11(a). In 
coming to his conclusion, Botha JA referred to the judgement in Port Elizabeth 
Electric Tramway Co Ltd v CIR and ITC 542 and stated that ‘actually incurred’ 
referred to the year in which a liability for the expenditure is incurred, whether the 
liability is discharged during that year or not.  
 
 In Nasionale Pers Bpk v Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste 48 SATC 55 
(‘Nasionale Pers Bpk v KBI’) the company wanted to deduct a provision for the future 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
39 
 
payment of bonuses, in terms of section 11(a). According to the contracts with each 
employee, the holiday bonuses were only payable to employees who were in the 
company’s employment on 31 October each year. The company’s year of 
assessment ended on 31 March and the company wanted to deduct a pro rata 
portion of the provision for bonuses in the particular year of assessment.  
 
In considering whether the expenditure was ‘actually incurred’, Hoexter AR held that 
possible future expenditure that is only deemed probable will not be deductible in 
terms of section 11(a). He held that for expenditure to be ‘actually incurred’, there 
must be a definite and absolute liability.  
 
Hoexter AR also referred to ITC 969 24 SATC 777 (‘ITC 969’) where it was held, with 
reference to the deductibility of expenditure in a provision similar to section 11(a), 
that the appellant company could not claim the deduction. This was because the 
appellant company could not prove that it had completely subjected itself to a liability 
and, therefore, the taxpayer had not incurred an absolute and unqualified legal 
liability. The expenditure was, therefore, not actually incurred.  
 
 Edgars Stores Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 50 SATC 81 (Edgars Stores 
Ltd v CIR) dealt with the deductibility of rental payments for the lease of premises in 
terms of section 11(a). The lease agreement provided for basic rental and turnover 
rental. The amount of turnover rental was based upon the lessee’s turnover over a 
twelve-month period, running from the date of the commencement of the lease. 
Consequently, the turnover rental was usually only ascertainable subsequent to the 
concluding date of the lessee’s year of assessment. Corbett JA considered the 
meaning of actually incurred and held that:  
 
[O]nly expenditure (otherwise qualifying for deduction) in respect of which 
the taxpayer has incurred an unconditional legal obligation during the year 
of assessment in question may be deducted in terms of section 11(a) from 
income returned for that year.  
 
[I]f the obligation is initially incurred as a conditional one during a particular 
year of assessment and the condition is fulfilled only in the following year 
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of assessment, it is deductible only in the latter year of assessment (the 
other requirements of deductibility being satisfied).(90) 
 
 In CIR v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd the court had to decide whether a liability that is in 
dispute at the end of the year of assessment is expenditure ‘actually incurred’ in 
terms of section 11(a). In considering whether the expenditure was actually incurred, 
Nicholas AJA referred, on p 205, to an Australian High Court case where it was held 
that:  
 
‘[I]ncurred’ does not mean only defrayed, discharged or borne, but rather it 
includes encountered, run into or fallen upon [… incurred] does not include 
a loss or expenditure which is no more than impending, threatened or 
expected. (own emphasis) 
 
The court held that where there is a dispute regarding a liability, the liability is 
contingent and the expenditure and losses are, therefore, not actually incurred and 
not deductible in the year of assessment.  
 
 In Ackermans Ltd v C: SARS, the company sold his business as a going concern. As 
part of the purchase price, the purchaser also took over the liabilities, which included 
contingent liabilities. The purchaser, therefore, paid for the net asset value of the 
business (the assets less the liabilities). The company contested that, by foregoing a 
portion of the assets’ purchase price, he incurred expenditure to free itself from the 
contingent liabilities. The company wanted to deduct the calculated value of the 
contingent liabilities as ‘expenditure actually incurred’ in terms of section 11(a). The 
court disallowed the deduction, as the company did not incur a liability in terms of the 
sales agreement.  
 
In coming to the conclusion Cloete JA held that:  
 
‘[E]xpenditure incurred’ means the undertaking of an obligation to pay or 
(which amounts to the same thing) the actual incurring of a liability. (5) 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
41 
 
2.6.4 Summary of case law on the meaning of ‘actually incurred’ and ‘incurred’ 
Table 2.2  Requirements for ‘actually incurred’ in terms of case law 
Conclusion from case law Reference 
 There is a liability to pay for expenditure; 
 Actually incurred cannot mean actually paid.  
Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway 
Co Ltd v CIR  
 Money is actually paid out; or  
 A taxpayer is legally liable to pay money.  
ITC 542 (by referring to 
unreported case 1877) 
 Actually incurred refers to the year in which a 
liability for the expenditure is incurred, whether the 
liability is discharged during that year or not. 
Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v SIR  
 There is a definite and absolute liability; 
 There is an absolute and unqualified legal liability. 
Nasionale Pers Bpk v KBI  
Nasionale Pers Bpk v KBI (by 
referring to ITC 969) 
 Actually incurred refers to expenditure in respect of 
which the taxpayer has incurred an unconditional 
legal obligation during the year of assessment. 
Edgars Stores Ltd v CIR  
 There is an undertaking of an obligation to pay; or  
 There is an actual incurral of a liability. 
Ackermans Ltd v C: SARS  
 
In the above mentioned judgements on the meaning of ‘actually incurred’, certain aspects 
were highlighted by the courts that indicate that expenditure is not yet ‘actually incurred’.  
 
Table 2.3  Indicators that serve to demonstrate that expenditure is not yet 
‘actually incurred’ during the year of assessment in terms of  
section 11(a) 
Conclusion from case law Reference 
 There is only possible future expenditure that is 
only deemed probable. 
Nasionale Pers Bpk v KBI  
 There is a dispute regarding a liability. A dispute 
would indicate that the liability is contingent. 
 There is loss or expenditure which is no more than 
impending, threatened or expected. 
CIR v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd  
 
CIR v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd 
(by referring to an Australian 
High Court case) 
 The taxpayer has a contingent liability. Ackermans Ltd v C: SARS 
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‘Incurred’, therefore, indicates that the taxpayer has, during the year of assessment, 
incurred an unconditional obligation to pay for expenditure. The word ‘unconditional’ 
implies that there are no conditions or future uncertain events that will influence the 
obligation to pay. It also implies that the obligation is not contingent. The word ‘actually’ 
confirms that the obligation to pay is not only possible or probable at year end, but the 
taxpayer has really or in fact incurred the obligation to pay during the year of assessment. 
Meyerowitz (2008:11-15) confirmed this and stated that however likely it is that the 
taxpayer will be called upon to pay for a contingent liability, if there is no absolute liability, 
the expenditure will not be actually incurred. 
 
The aforementioned meaning of the word ‘incurred’ will be used to determine the meaning 
of ‘will be incurred’, as used in section 24C(1) and section 24C(2). 
 
2.7 The meaning of ‘will be incurred’ 
Section 24C(1) requires that the Commissioner must be satisfied that the amount of 
expenditure will be incurred after the end of the year of assessment; and 
 
Section 24C(2) requires that the Commissioner must be satisfied that the future 
expenditure will be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under 
such contract. 
 
The phrase ‘will be incurred’, as used in section 24C, is not defined in the Act. The 
meaning of ‘will be incurred’ is discussed with reference to: 
 
 The ordinary English meaning, 
 The Explanatory Memorandum on section 24C, and 
 The meaning of the word ‘incurred’, as used in section 11(a). 
 
2.7.1 The meaning of the phrase ‘will be incurred’ with reference to its ordinary 
English meaning 
In terms of the rules of language, ‘will’ is an auxiliary verb, also known as a helping verb 
that refers, inter alia, to the future. The auxiliary verb ‘will’ is used to make predictions or 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
43 
 
simple statements of fact about the future (A Guide to Learning English, 2011:Future 
Tense).  
 
The word ‘be’ is described in the OED (2014:be) as: 
 
To come into existence, come about, happen, occur, take place, be carried out 
or done; to take its due course, have the appointed period of time. (own 
emphasis) 
 
The OED (2014:will-be) describes the phrase ‘will-be’ as:  
 
A person or thing that will be but is not yet. (own emphasis) 
 
The word ‘incur’ is described in the OED (2014:incur) as: 
 
To run or fall into (some consequence, usually undesirable or injurious); to 
become through one's own action liable or subject to; to bring upon oneself. 
(own emphasis) 
 
The meaning of will be incurred can, according to its ordinary English meaning, be 
summarised as follows: 
 
 In the future (will), a liability (incurred), will come into existence (be); 
 The liability is not yet in existence. 
 
2.7.2 The meaning of the phrase ‘will be incurred’ with reference to the Explanatory 
Memorandum on section 24C 
The Explanatory Memorandum refers to a situation where a taxpayer is taxed on large 
advance payments which are not matched by deductible expenditure in the same year of 
assessment. From the Explanatory Memorandum, it seems that the purpose of  
section 24C is to create an allowance that will match the income from the contract with the 
future deductible expenditure. It is clear that this allowance represents the expenditure that 
will be deductible in the calculation of taxable income in a subsequent year of assessment. 
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With reference to the Explanatory Memorandum, it is concluded that the phrase ‘will be 
incurred’ refers to the incurral of an amount of expenditure that will be deductible in the 
calculation of the taxpayer’s taxable income in a subsequent year of assessment. The 
phrase ‘will be incurred’, therefore, speaks of the deductibility of the expenditure in a year 
of assessment subsequent to the year in which the income in terms of the contract is 
received or accrues.  
 
2.7.3 ‘Will be incurred’: Section 24C 
With reference to the meaning of the word ‘incurred’, as set out in 2.6, the ordinary English 
meaning of the phrase ‘will be incurred’ and the Explanatory Memorandum, it is submitted 
that the meaning of the phrase ‘will be incurred’ in section 24C(1) implies that: 
 
 in the future (will) 
 an unconditional obligation to pay for expenditure (incurred)  
 will come into existence (be).  
 This unconditional obligation to pay for expenditure does not exist at year-end, but it 
will exist in the future. Section 24C(1) specifies the future as a subsequent year of 
assessment. 
 This unconditional obligation to pay for expenditure will represent an amount that is 
deductible in the calculation of taxable income.  
 
Thus, the taxpayer is not required to have an unconditional obligation to pay for 
expenditure at the end of the year of assessment. He must, however, satisfy the 
Commissioner that an unconditional obligation to pay for expenditure will come into 
existence in a subsequent year of assessment, and that it will be an amount that is 
deductible in the calculation of taxable income. As the taxpayer has not yet incurred this 
unconditional obligation to pay for expenditure during the current year of assessment, the 
question that arises is: What will serve to demonstrate that the expenditure will be 
incurred? This question can be stated differently: What will indicate that the taxpayer will 
have an unconditional obligation to pay for expenditure in a subsequent year of 
assessment? 
 
It is argued that the answer to this question lies in section 24C(2). Section 24C(2) also 
uses the phrase ‘will be incurred’. This section, however, provides for an additional 
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requirement for ‘will be incurred’, namely, the future expenditure will be incurred by the 
taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under a contract. 
 
To summarise, it is submitted that the phrase ‘will be incurred’, as used in section 24C, 
implies that the taxpayer will have an unconditional obligation to pay for expenditure in a 
subsequent year of assessment. This obligation to pay for expenditure must arise from the 
taxpayer’s obligations to perform under the contract. This is in agreement with the 
argument in 2.4.2, where it was shown that there must be a definite connection between 
the contract that determines the taxpayer’s obligation to perform and the incurral of the 
future expenditure. Chapter 3 and 4 will discuss indicators that will serve to demonstrate 
whether future expenditure will be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his 
obligations under the contract. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
Chapter 2 determined that the word ‘future’ refers to the fact the expenditure must be 
incurred in a year of assessment subsequent to the year in which the income in terms of 
the contract is received or accrues. The word ‘expenditure’ means the amount of money 
spent, including the disbursement of other assets with a monetary value. The word 
‘expenditure’ will include, inter alia, a voluntary payment of money by the taxpayer and the 
voluntary disbursement of the taxpayer’s assets. 
 
Furthermore, the word ‘expenditure’ will include a loss if the word ‘loss’ can be equated to 
the word ‘expenditure’. However, if the word ‘loss’ cannot be equated to the word 
‘expenditure’, it is not certain whether it is excluded from section 24C. The fact that  
section 24C does not include the word ‘loss’ is an indication that if the word ‘loss’ cannot 
be equated with the word ‘expenditure’, it will, in all likelihood, not be deductible in terms of  
section 24C. 
 
It was determined that the phrase ‘will be incurred’, as used in section 24C, implies that 
the taxpayer will have an unconditional obligation to pay for expenditure in a year of 
assessment subsequent to the year in which the income in terms of the contract is 
received or accrues, and this expenditure will be deductible expenditure in terms of 
sections 24C(1)(a) or (b). Further, this obligation to pay for expenditure must arise from the 
taxpayer’s obligations to perform under the contract. 
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In chapter 3 the focus will shift to the taxpayer’s obligations to perform under the contract 
and to the related incurral of future expenditure. The contractual terms that may affect the 
incurral of the future expenditure will also be discussed. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE TAXPAYER’S OBLIGATIONS TO 
PERFORM UNDER THE CONTRACT AND THE RELATED INCURRAL OF FUTURE 
EXPENDITURE  
3.1  Introduction 
In chapter 2 it was determined that the phrase ‘will be incurred’, as used in section 24C, 
implies that the taxpayer must be able to prove that he will have an unconditional 
obligation to pay for expenditure in a subsequent year of assessment and that this 
expenditure will be deductible in terms of sections 24C(1)(a) or (b). It was also determined 
that there must be a definite connection between the incurral of future expenditure and the 
taxpayer’s obligations to perform under the contract. 
 
Section 24C(2) determines that the Commissioner must be satisfied that the requirements 
of this section are met before he will permit the allowance to be deducted. It is, therefore, 
relevant to first consider how the burden of proof will be discharged. The meaning of the 
words ‘contract’, ‘obligation’ and ‘performance’, as used in section 24C(2), are briefly 
discussed to establish the connection between the incurral of future expenditure and the 
taxpayer’s obligations to perform under a contract. The remainder of the chapter focuses 
on how the contractual terms serve as indicators to demonstrate whether there is certainty 
that the future expenditure will be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his 
obligations under the contract. 
 
3.2 The taxpayer’s burden of proof 
In the event that the taxpayer and the Commissioner disagree on the deductibility of future 
expenditure in terms of section 24C, section 102(1)(b) of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 
2011 determines that the taxpayer bears the burden to prove that an amount is deductible. 
 
The burden of proof refers to the liability that rests on a party to convince the adjudicator of 
the allegations that he [the party] has made (Schwikkard & Van der Merwe, 2009:599). In 
terms of section 24C, this implies that, if the taxpayer wants to claim a section 24C 
allowance, the burden rests on the taxpayer to prove to the Commissioner that the 
requirements of section 24C are met. If the taxpayer disagrees with the Commissioner’s 
final application of his discretion, the taxpayer has, since 1994, the right to objection and 
appeal, in terms of section 3(4) of the Act. Chapter 9 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 
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2011 regulates the dispute resolution proses. Prior to 1994 the taxpayer only had the 
option to request a review of the assessment issued by the Commissioner (ITC 1697 63 
SATC 146) (‘ITC 1697’)6.  
 
In civil cases, the burden of proof rests on the appellant to show, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the allegations that he has made do, in fact, exist (Schwikkard & Van der 
Merwe, 2009:621). The phrase ‘on a balance of probabilities’, has been defined by Lord 
Denning in Miller v Minister of Pensions 2 All ER 372 as follows: 
 
It must carry a reasonable degree of probability, but not so high as is required in 
a criminal case. If the evidence is such that the tribunal can say: ‘We think it 
more probable than not,’ the burden is discharged, but, if the probabilities are 
equal, it is not. (374) 
 
In ITC 1601, a Tax Court case on section 24C, the court held that, when applying  
section 24C, the burden rests on the taxpayer to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that 
the section 24C allowance is deductible. It is submitted that the court thereby implied that 
the taxpayer must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the various requirements of  
sections 24C(1) and (2) are met and that the Commissioner should then allow the 
allowance to be deducted.  
 
The phrase ‘on a balance of probabilities’ can, however, easily be misinterpreted by a 
taxpayer. For example, if a taxpayer must prove that the future expenditure will be 
incurred, he could perhaps argue that, to discharge his burden, he is only required to 
prove that the incurral of future expenditure in terms of a contract is probable. He could 
base his proof, for example, on historical data or by grouping similar contracts together. It 
is, however, argued that the phrase ‘on a balance of probabilities’ in this regard does not 
refer to the provision of evidence that indicates that it is probable that the future 
expenditure will be incurred. Rather, it means that it must be proved that the expenditure 
will, on a balance of probabilities, definitely be incurred. Contractual terms that a taxpayer 
can use to prove that the requirements of section 24C are met, are discussed in further 
detail in 3.4. 
                                             
6 This is important to note, as some of the Tax Court cases on section 24C, which will be discussed in 
chapter 4, are dated prior to 1994, which implies that the taxpayer could not object and appeal after the 
Commissioner’s final decision. 
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3.3 The meaning of the words ‘contract’, ‘obligation’ and ‘performance’ 
Section 24C(2) uses the phrase ‘in the performance of his obligations under such 
contract’. The meaning of the phrase must be considered to gain an understanding of its 
impact on the interpretation of section 24C. Words occurring in this phrase that are of 
particular importance are: ‘contract’, ‘obligations’ and ‘performance’7. Once the meaning of 
these words has been determined, the interplay between the incurral of the expenditure 
and the taxpayer’s obligations to perform under the contract can be established (refer to 
3.3.3.1).  
 
3.3.1 Contract 
A contract is defined as an obligatory agreement that comes into existence if the parties 
intend to create an obligation, provided that all the requirements for the creation of 
obligation by agreement are met8 (Van der Merwe et al., 2007:8).  
 
In the context of section 24C, the form and the nature of the contract in terms of which the 
income was received, are immaterial (Davis et al., 2013:24C-2). Section 24C is, therefore, 
not limited to specific types of contracts. It is, however, in terms of section 24C, important 
that a contract must exist and that the ‘income’ received by or accrued to the taxpayer 
must originate from the same contract that determines the taxpayer’s obligations to 
perform (refer to chapter 2.3.2).  
 
3.3.2 Obligation  
The legal concept ‘obligation’ means a legal tie or bond which binds together legal 
subjects (persons) (Van der Merwe et al., 2007:2). The content of an obligation consists of 
                                             
7 The terms ‘contract’, ‘obligation’ and ’performance’ are only briefly discussed as a background for the 
interpretation of section 24C. It is important to note that the Law of Contract is a separate study field, and 
these discussions are by no means an in-depth study of the Law of Contract.  
8 The requirements for a valid contract (an obligatory agreement) are, inter alia, the contractual capacity of 
the parties, possibility of performance, legality of the agreement and prescribed formalities (Van der Merwe 
et al., 2007:8). A discussion of these requirements falls outside the scope of this assignment. For the 
purpose of this assignment it will be assumed that, when reference is made to a contract or the obligation 
created by the contract, all the requirements for a valid contract are met.  
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both a right to performance by the creditor and a duty to render performance by the debtor 
(Van der Merwe et al., 2007:2).  
 
In the context of section 24C, the taxpayer who wants to claim a section 24C allowance, 
has received ‘income’ from the contract and the taxpayer will, therefore, be the party who 
has an obligation to render a performance. The taxpayer will, accordingly, be the debtor. 
The person who paid the income to the taxpayer in terms of the contract will be the 
creditor, as he is the person who has a right to performance9. 
 
Section 24C refers, in the plural, to the obligations under the contract. The question, 
therefore, arises: If a contract contains more than one obligation to perform in terms 
thereof, should each obligation be considered separately when applying section 24C, or 
should the obligations be considered as an entirety? It is argued that the answer to this 
question lies in first identifying the actual performances that are required to fulfil the 
obligations created by the contract. This is discussed further in 3.3.3. 
 
3.3.3 Performance 
Kellaway (1995:474-475) describes the word ‘perform’ as: ‘giving effect to the obligation 
created by the contract, whether affirmative or negative’, and ‘to fulfil a duty created by the 
contract’. Kellaway further describes the phrase ‘performing the obligations under a 
contract’ as: ‘fulfilling the duty created by it, whether to do, or to abstain from doing, a 
thing’. It is thus clear that it is the taxpayer’s performance of the obligations under the 
contract that will fulfil the obligations created by it. 
 
3.3.3.1 The interplay between the taxpayer’s obligations to perform under the 
contract and the related incurral of future expenditure 
It has been established that there must be a definite connection between the incurral of the 
future expenditure and the contract that determines the taxpayer’s obligations to perform. 
From 3.3.3 is clear that the actual performance of the obligations is the action that will 
determine whether future expenditure will be incurred, and not the obligations itself. It is, 
accordingly, submitted that, in order to determine whether the future expenditure will be 
                                             
9 In this chapter, and in relation to the obligations that exist in terms of the contract, when reference is made 
to the taxpayer, it can be assumed that he is the debtor, as opposed to the other party as the creditor. 
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incurred, it is necessary to identify the performances required to fulfil the obligations 
created by the contact. Once these performances have been identified, it must be 
determined whether there is certainty that it will be performed and whether it will lead to 
the incurral of future expenditure.  
 
To identify these performances, it is necessary to consider the divisibility of the 
performances required to fulfil the obligations created by the contract. 
 
3.3.3.2 Divisibility of performances 
According to De Wet and Van Wyk (1992:145) the divisibility or indivisibility of the 
performance in terms of the contract are of importance. The two considerations that should 
be taken into account to determine whether a performance is divisible or indivisible are the 
nature of the performance and the intention of the parties. According to Van der Merwe et 
al. (2007:313), when considering the intention of the parties, the test is to determine 
whether the parties regard the performance as consisting of separate parts or as a single 
entity. Van der Merwe et al. further state that if a contract contains more than one 
performance, it gives rise to more than one obligation. Every distinguishable performance 
in terms of the contract, therefore, creates an obligation (2007:311). 
 
The following example is given by Van der Merwe et al. (2007:313) to describe the 
difference between a divisible and an indivisible performance: Delivery of one horse in 
terms of a contract is an indivisible performance due to the nature of the object. Delivery of 
a team of two horses can be physically divided in two performances, but if the intention of 
the parties is that two specific horses must be delivered together to fulfil the obligation, 
then the performance is indivisible due to the intention of the parties.  
 
Further, Van der Merwe et al. (2007:314) states that the divisibility of performance does 
not depend on the divisibility of the counter-performance. In relation to section 24C, this 
implies that even though a taxpayer might receive only one payment from the creditor in 
terms of a contract, the taxpayer might be required to render more than one indivisible 
performance to fulfil more than one obligation created by the contract.  
 
From the aforementioned it is submitted that, in the context of section 24C, if the nature of 
the performances required to fulfil the obligations under the contract and the intention of 
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the parties indicate that there are more than one indivisible performance in terms of the 
contract, each indivisible performance should be identified. Once the indivisible 
performances required to fulfil the obligations under the contract have been identified, it 
must be determined whether there is certainty that it will be performed and whether it will 
lead to the incurral of future expenditure.  
 
3.3.3.3 Certainty of performance and the related incurral of future expenditure 
In chapter 2 it was shown that ‘will be incurred’ implies that the taxpayer will, in a 
subsequent year of assessment, have a definite obligation to pay for expenditure arising 
from his obligation to perform under the contract. This is opposed to only having a 
probable or possible obligation to pay for future expenditure. In the OED (2014:definite), 
the word ‘definite’ is defined as ‘having fixed or exact limits; clearly defined, determinate, 
fixed, certain; exact, precise’. (own emphasis) 
 
From the aforementioned it is submitted that the term ‘will be incurred’ implies that there 
must be certainty regarding the incurral of future expenditure. The incurral of future 
expenditure must, therefore, not only be possible or probable. It is further submitted that if 
the incurral of the future expenditure must be certain, it infers that the performance of the 
obligations that will lead to the incurral of the expenditure must also be certain at the end 
of the year of assessment in which the taxpayer wishes to apply section 24C. 
 
It is, therefore, necessary to determine which indicators can serve to demonstrate that 
there is certainty regarding the taxpayer’s performance of the obligations under a contract 
in a subsequent year of assessment. The concept of certainty regarding the incurral of 
future expenditure has also appeared in arguments in Tax Court cases on section 24C, 
which will be discussed in chapter 4. 
 
3.4 Contractual terms and their effect on the certainty that the taxpayer will 
perform his obligations under the contract and on the certainty of the incurral 
of the related future expenditure 
Contracting parties express their intention to create specific obligations in their contract 
through the use of terms or stipulations (Van der Merwe et al., 2007:278). According to 
Van Rensburg, Lotz and Van Rhijn (2010:par 427) the terms in a contract are the 
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provisions that the contracting parties use to indicate the nature and details of the 
performances due by the parties. This can include the manner, the time and place of 
performance. Any other stipulations that the parties may agree upon can also be included 
as terms in the contract. Examples of common contractual terms given by Van der Merwe 
et al. are: assumption, conditions, time clauses, warranties and exemption clauses 
(2007:285-297).  
 
Van Huyssteen et al. (2010:143) noted that ‘In South African Law conditions and 
warranties are special contractual terms with particular content and specific 
consequences’ (own emphasis). It is, accordingly, necessary to consider the contractual 
terms, as they may possibly affect the certainty as to whether the taxpayer will perform his 
obligations under the contract.  
 
In the remainder of the section, three contractual terms, namely, conditions, warranties 
and time clauses are discussed. The discussion will indicate whether these contractual 
terms are indicators that serve to demonstrate whether there is certainty that the taxpayer 
will perform his obligations under a contract and, accordingly, whether future expenditure 
‘will be incurred’. 
 
3.4.1 Conditions  
A condition is a term that qualifies the contractual obligation (Van der Merwe et al., 
2007:287). Van der Merwe et al. further state that conditions make the operation and 
consequence of the obligation dependent on an uncertain future event that will either 
happen or not. Uncertainty is, therefore, an indispensable element of a conditional 
obligation (De Wet & Van Wyk, 1992:149). This implies that the conditions in a contract 
influence the certainty as to whether the obligation will be performed or not. Therefore, the 
conditions in the contract must be considered when determining whether the performance 
of the obligation in the contract will lead to the incurral of future expenditure. A condition 
should, however, not be confused with a time clause, which is a term that regulates the 
performance of the taxpayer with reference to a certain or uncertain time in the future 
(refer to 3.4.3). 
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Suspensive and resolutive conditions 
 
Conditions can be classified according to the effect that the fulfilment of the condition has 
on the obligation, namely, whether it discharges an obligation (resolutive condition) or 
activates an obligation (suspensive condition) (Van Rensburg et al., 2010:par 436). 
 
A suspensive condition is a condition that qualifies the operation of the obligation in that it 
suspends the obligation until certainty is reached that the condition is fulfilled (Van der 
Merwe et al., 2007:289). According to Van Huyssteen et al. (2010:143), it is generally 
recognised that an obligation exists, despite the fact that the contract contains a 
suspensive condition. However, an obligation that is suspended by a condition cannot be 
enforced until fulfilment of the condition and, therefore, cannot be validly performed (Van 
der Merwe et al., 2007:293). Accordingly, only once the condition has been fulfilled will 
there be certainty that the taxpayer will have to perform in order to fulfil the obligation 
created by the contract and, accordingly, incur the related expenditure.  
 
If there is a resolutive condition in the contract, the obligation operates in full and the 
performance is, therefore, not postponed (Van der Merwe et al., 2007:289). The moment 
the condition comes in to effect, the obligation to perform is discharged (Kellaway, 
1995:475). Thus, when there is a resolutive condition, the continued existence of the 
obligation is uncertain (Van Huyssteen et al., 2010:143). This implies that, although a 
taxpayer is already performing in terms of the contract, the taxpayer cannot be sure that 
he will have to continue to perform in terms of the contract. Accordingly, the uncertain 
future event might end the taxpayer’s obligation to perform under the contract at any time 
and, therefore, also end the incurral of the related expenditure.  
 
The matter of suspensive and resolutive conditions was addressed in Nasionale Pers Bpk 
v KBI. This case related to the deductibility of the provision for the future payment of 
bonuses in terms of section 11(a). In this case, it had to be determined whether the 
expenditure was ‘actually incurred’, as required by section 11(a) (refer to chapter 2.6.3 for 
the background of this case). In its argument, Nasionale Pers Bpk contested that its 
obligation to pay bonuses was subject to a resolutive condition, namely, that if the 
employee was still in the company’s employment on 31 October of any given year, the 
employee would receive a bonus. Nasionale Pers Bpk, therefore, contested that an 
obligation arose to pay bonuses at the end of every month and the obligation only ceased 
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if the employee’s services were terminated before 31 October. In reaching his conclusion, 
Hoexter AR, however, held that on 31 March (the end of the taxpayer’s year of 
assessment) there was an uncertain future event, namely, whether the employee would be 
in service on 31 October. This event fell outside the company’s year of assessment. The 
question whether Nasionale Pers Bpk was in law obligated to pay the bonus to an 
employee could only be answered on 31 October. It was also held that it is unnecessary to 
make a distinction between a suspensive and resolutive condition, as both these 
conditions refer to an uncertain future event. In this case it was, accordingly, held that the 
expenditure was only deemed probable and there was no definite or absolute liability and, 
therefore, the expenditure was not actually incurred and not deductible in terms of section 
11(a). 
 
It is submitted that the same principle laid down in Nasionale Pers Bpk v KBI should be 
applicable when interpreting section 24C. When a contract contains a condition (either 
suspensive or resolutive) which qualifies the obligation to perform, the obligation to 
perform is conditional and, therefore, only probable and not yet definite or absolute. 
Further, because the obligation to perform is conditional, the taxpayer cannot be certain 
whether he will have to perform in terms of the contract. As there is uncertainty regarding 
future performance, the taxpayer will not be able to demonstrate that future expenditure 
will be incurred and, therefore, the requirements of section 24C(2) will not be met.  
 
Further, in Nasionale Pers Bpk v KBI it was also contested that the expenditure that 
related to the payment of the bonuses could be distributed amongst the entire population 
of employees and that the expenditure was an inevitable commercial reality. Hoexter AR, 
however, held that Nasionale Pers Bpk could not refer to a collective obligation to pay 
bonuses, as the company had concluded obligations with each individual employee and 
each individual contract was subject to a condition. 
 
It is submitted that this principle is also applicable when interpreting section 24C. As 
already mentioned in chapter 2.3.2, section 24C(2) requires that the income must be 
received from the same contract that determines the taxpayer’s obligation to perform. 
Section 24C, therefore, also refers to an individual contract. Each contract and its related 
obligations to perform should meet the requirements of section 24C on their own merit. In 
the event that a taxpayer is involved in several similar contracts containing similar 
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conditional obligations, the contracts cannot be grouped together to determine the 
probability that the future expenditure will be incurred.  
 
To summarise, in relation to section 24C, conditions in the contract imply that the 
performance of the obligations under the contract and the related incurral of future 
expenditure are subject to the occurrence of an uncertain future event. Accordingly, the 
taxpayer will not be able to prove that expenditure will be incurred by him in the 
performance of his obligations under a contract in the subsequent year of assessment. 
Conditions in a contract are, therefore, indicators that serve to demonstrate that it is 
uncertain that the future expenditure will be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of 
his obligations under a contract.  
 
Following the aforementioned, it is argued that the absence of conditions in a contract can 
be an indicator that the taxpayer will be able to prove that expenditure will be incurred in 
the performance of his obligations under a contract in the subsequent year of assessment. 
This is assuming that there are no other contractual terms that affect the taxpayer’s 
obligation to perform under the contract.  
 
3.4.2 Warranties  
Van Rensburg et al. (2010:par 447) describe a warranty as ‘a contractual undertaking by a 
debtor that a certain fact relating to his or her performance is or will be as it is stated or 
promised to be’. Van Rensburg et al. further state that, in the case of a warranty, the 
debtor promises to make good any loss suffered by the creditor due to the fact that the 
debtor’s performance did not realise as warranted. If a debtor cannot perform as promised, 
he will be held liable for damages for breach of contract (Van der Merwe et al., 2007:296). 
 
In Schmidt v Dwyer 1 All SA 6 (C) a warranty was defined as follows:  
 
The general rule is that where a vendor makes a representation or an assertion 
of a positive and material fact in regard to the quality or quantity of the thing 
sold, such conduct on his part amounts to a definite promise or warranty, for a 
breach of which he will be liable. (10) 
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A taxpayer can, therefore, be liable, in terms of a contract from which he receive income, 
for damages suffered by a creditor. This implies that a warranty in a contract can, 
therefore, also lead to the incurral of future expenditure in the performance of the 
taxpayer’s obligations under a contract. 
 
In the context of section 24C, the effect of a warranty in a contract can be explained by the 
following example: In terms of a sales contract, a taxpayer receives R1 000 from a client 
and must provide a product to the client. The sales contract also contains a warranty 
regarding the quality of the product, stating that if the product is defective the client can 
return the product and the taxpayer will replace it with a new product. Assume that the 
product has already been delivered during the year of assessment, but the warranty is 
valid for a period that continues after the end of the year of assessment. The taxpayer will 
only know whether he is liable for damages when the creditor indicates that the product is 
defective. Until the latter event, the taxpayer will not know whether he is liable for damages 
and, accordingly, whether he will have to perform under the warranty in the contract. 
 
The same argument mentioned in 3.4.1 with regards to conditions will, therefore, also 
apply to warranties. As the taxpayer cannot be certain whether he will be liable to 
compensate the client for damages in terms of the warranty in the contract, he cannot be 
certain that he will have to incur future expenditure. A warranty in a contract is, therefore, 
also an indicator that can serve to demonstrate that the incurral of the related expenditure 
will be uncertain, and the taxpayer will, accordingly, not be able to prove that he will incur 
future expenditure in the performance of his obligations under a contract. 
 
3.4.3 Time clauses 
If there is a term in the contract that relates to an event that is certain, but the timing of the 
event is uncertain, then it is not a condition, but a time clause (De Wet & Van Wyk, 
1992:149). Van Huyssteen et al. (2010:142) state that, if the parties to a contract 
contemplate a certain moment or event in the future as a qualification, it is a time clause, 
as opposed to a condition, even though it is uncertain when it will occur.  
 
If a contract contains a time clause it, therefore, regulates the time of the performance and 
indicates when the performance must be rendered. The contract can refer to a specific 
date on which the performance must be rendered. The contract can also refer to an event 
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that is certain to happen, and when this event occurs, the performance must be rendered 
in terms of the contract.  
 
Following the aforementioned it is submitted that when parties insert a time clause, their 
intention is not to make their performance subject to the occurrence of an uncertain future 
event, but rather that both parties are certain and agree that the event will happen. A time 
clause, therefore, indicates that there is certainty that future expenditure will be incurred in 
the performance of the taxpayer’s obligations under the contract.  
 
3.4.4 Conclusion on contractual terms 
In the context of section 24C, it is important to note that the taxpayer has already received 
or accrued the income from a contract that obligates him to perform. The client has 
accordingly already paid or is liable to pay the taxpayer, fully or partially, for the 
performance that the taxpayer must render to fulfil his obligations under the contract. For 
the purpose of section 24C, it is important to identify the terms in the contract that indicate 
whether there is certainty or uncertainty regarding the performance of the taxpayer, 
because this indicates whether there is certainty or uncertainty regarding the incurral of the 
related future expenditure.  
 
Conditions and warranties in a contract serve as indicators that there is uncertainty 
regarding the taxpayer’s performance of his obligations under a contract and, accordingly, 
that there is uncertainty regarding the incurral of related future expenditure. A time clause 
is an indication that there is certainty regarding the taxpayer’s performance of his 
obligations under a contract and, accordingly, that there is certainty regarding the incurral 
of related future expenditure. It is, therefore, important to distinguish between different 
contractual terms, as their effect on the certainty regarding the incurral of future 
expenditure differs.  
 
Kellaway (1995:478) states that, when a court is required to decide whether a term in a 
contract is a condition or another term that relates to the performance of the contract, the 
court is entitled to consider the surrounding circumstances and the facts that were 
available when the contract was made, for example, the customs of trade or the course of 
the business between the parties. In chapter 4, the available Tax Court cases on  
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section 24C will be discussed to determine which contractual terms and other 
circumstances the courts have considered in their interpretation of section 24C.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Chapter 3 showed that to discharge the burden of proof, a taxpayer must prove to the 
Commissioner, on a balance of probabilities, which implies that it is more probable than 
not, that the various requirements of sections 24C(1) and (2) are met. If the burden is 
discharged, the Commissioner should allow the section 24C allowance to be deducted.  
 
It was determined that the performance that the taxpayer must render to fulfill the 
obligations created by the contract must lead to the incurral of the future expenditure. Each 
indivisible performance in a contract must be identified and, for each indivisible 
performance, it must be determined whether the performance will lead to the incurral of 
expenditure in a subsequent year of assessment. A taxpayer cannot group similar 
contracts with similar conditional obligations to perform together in order to determine the 
probability that future expenditure will be incurred in the performance of the taxpayer’s 
obligations under a contract. Each contract should meet the requirements of section 24C 
on its own merit. 
 
Contractual terms regulate the performance of the parties and can be used as indicators to 
demonstrate whether there is certainty that future expenditure will be incurred in the 
performance of the taxpayer’s obligations under the contract.  
 
Conditions and warranties are contractual terms that indicate that there is uncertainty 
regarding the taxpayer’s obligations to perform under the contract. These two contractual 
terms, accordingly, also indicate that there is uncertainty regarding the incurral of related 
future expenditure. On the other hand, the absence of conditions or warranties, or the 
inclusion of a time clause in a contract, can indicate that there is certainty regarding the 
taxpayer’s obligations to perform under the contract. The aforementioned is, therefore, an 
indication that there is certainty regarding the incurral of related future expenditure.  
 
In chapter 4 the indicators, as mentioned, will be tested against available Tax Court cases 
on section 24C, with specific reference to the concept of ‘certainty’.  
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CHAPTER 4: REPORTED TAX COURT CASES AND BINDING PRIVATE RULINGS 
RELATING TO THE CERTAINTY OF THE INCURRAL OF FUTURE EXPENDITURE IN 
TERMS OF SECTION 24C 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter 3 it was determined that certainty must exist that the taxpayer will perform his 
obligations under the contract and, consequently, that certainty must exist regarding the 
incurral of related future expenditure. Chapter 4 will discuss available Tax Court cases and 
binding private rulings (‘BPR’) where consideration was given to whether expenditure 
would be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under a contract. 
 
There are currently no court cases decided by a higher court (Provincial Division of the 
High Court or the Supreme Court of Appeal), that give authority on section 24C. It is, 
however, meaningful to study available Tax Court cases and BPR, as this provides insight 
to the Commissioner’s interpretation of section 24C and as to whether the Tax Court 
agreed with the Commissioner’s or the taxpayer’s interpretation of section 24C. 
 
The judgements and guidance provided by the courts in these cases and by the 
Commissioner in the BPR will be compared to the findings in chapters 2 and 3. Other 
findings by the courts that provide guidance on the certainty as to whether ‘future 
expenditure will be incurred’ will be identified and critically discussed. Specific emphasis 
will be placed on the treatment of warranties in contracts and repair and maintenance 
contracts.  
 
4.2 Reported Tax Court cases on section 24C 
4.2.1 ITC 1527 54 SATC 227  
The appellant (‘the taxpayer’) carried on the business, inter alia, of a furniture dealer under 
the slogan ‘your two year guarantee store’. Approximately 80-85% of the taxpayer’s sales 
were effected through installment sale agreements (‘the contract’). The contract did not 
contain any reference to a guarantee. However, a guarantee was provided to the 
purchaser by means of a separate document. 
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In terms of the contract, the taxpayer had the obligation to insure the goods purchased by 
the buyer. The contract authorised the taxpayer to include the premiums payable by him to 
the insurer in the principal debt of the purchaser and to make monthly premium payments 
to the insurer.  
 
In submitting his income tax returns, the taxpayer sought to deduct, from his income, 
allowances in terms of section 24C. The taxpayer argued that his business was conducted 
on extended terms of credit and that, although the profit on the sale was recognised when 
the sale was concluded, cost of debt collection was incurred in subsequent periods. The 
taxpayer also stated that, under the Usury Act 73 of 1968 and in the case of a default in 
the payment of any installment, there was an administrative burden on the taxpayer to 
remedy such default. He also stated that if the furniture was defective, he would incur 
expenditure to collect this defective furniture to have it repaired in terms of the guarantee. 
It was, however, noted that the suppliers of the furniture were responsible for any repairs 
to defective furniture and not the taxpayer himself.  
 
The taxpayer, accordingly, argued that he was required to incur staff, communication 
computer, legal and other administrative costs (‘overhead expenditure’) in order to 
effectively manage and service the contracts for up to two years after the sale was 
concluded. In the light of the aforementioned, the taxpayer argued that he would incur 
future expenditure in the performance of his obligations under the contracts.  
 
The taxpayer provided the Commissioner with a schedule, indicating that his credit sales 
amounted to an average of 80% of his total sales. Based on this percentage, the taxpayer 
used various percentages, most of them lower than 80%, to allocate different overhead 
expenditure to the credit sales. The taxpayer stated that the expenditure allocated to credit 
sales represented ‘future expenditure’ in terms of section 24C. The Commissioner was not 
satisfied with this schedule and stated that he sought a logical basis for the allocation of 
the various forms of overhead expenditure to the section 24C allowance. The schedule, 
together with the standard contract provided by the taxpayer, did not satisfy the 
Commissioner that the requirements of section 24C had been met and the deduction was, 
accordingly, disallowed.  
 
Before the court, the taxpayer argued that the Commissioner did not exercise a proper 
discretion in disallowing the section 24C allowance. He stated that the allowance had been 
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granted for the previous seven years and that it was obvious that the income from the 
contracts was utilised to finance future expenditure. He, accordingly, asked for a review of 
the administrative discretion exercised by the Commissioner10,11. 
 
In coming to his conclusion, Melament J, inter alia, held that: 
 
 The overhead expenditure in question was not ‘future expenditure’, but past 
expenditure. 
 The taxpayer could not provide evidence that the contact imposed any obligation on 
him in respect of the overhead expenditure in question.  
 Any obligation under a guarantee was not an obligation under the contract. 
 The only obligation that the taxpayer had under the contract was to include the goods 
purchased by each buyer under the Group all-risk insurance scheme and to pay the 
premiums on behalf of those insured. Because the premiums were included in the 
principal debt, the taxpayer merely acted as a conduit, and had no liability himself 
under the insurance policy. Melament J held that this obligation in terms of the 
contract, to administrate the insurance premiums, could entail only a minimal 
administration cost. The taxpayer did not provide proof as to what this specific 
administration cost was.  
 The obligation that the taxpayer had under the Usury Act was not an obligation under 
the contract and it was imposed on the taxpayer by virtue of the nature and the 
manner in which the business was conducted.  
 
Although the court was not required to make a judgement on whether the expenditure 
would be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under the contract, 
it is clear from the arguments that Melament J agreed with the Commissioner in 
                                             
10 Prior to 1994, if the taxpayer disagreed with the Commissioner’s final application of his discretion in  
section 24C, the taxpayer only had the option to request a review of the assessment issued by the 
Commissioner. Since 1994, the taxpayer has the right to objection and appeal in terms of section 3(4) of the 
Act (ITC 1697 63 SATC 146). 
11 When a special court is required to review the administrative discretion exercised by the Commissioner, 
the court must decide whether the Commissioner followed the correct procedure in exercising his discretion 
and whether he applied his mind to the issues and facts before him at the time. The appellant is, therefore, 
not allowed to bring any new evidence before the special court (ITC 1601 58 SATC 172). 
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disallowing the allowance. Melament J finally concluded that the Commissioner did 
exercise proper discretion.  
 
4.2.1.1 Definite connection between the incurral of expenditure and the obligation 
to perform under the contract 
In chapter 2.4.2 it was established that a definite connection must exist between the 
incurral of the future expenditure and the taxpayer’s performance of his obligations under a 
contract. ITC 1527 confirms this, showing that the contract must stipulate a specific 
obligation and the performance of this obligation must lead to the incurral of future 
expenditure. The taxpayer cannot allocate general overhead expenditure to the  
section 24C allowance unless a definite connection exists. It is, therefore, submitted that, 
in the absence of this definite connection, there will not be certainty that future expenditure 
will be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under a contract.  
ITC 1527 further shows that, in the absence of a specific obligation to perform under a 
contract, section 24C cannot be applied.  
 
4.2.1.2 The contract 
In chapter 2.3.2 it was shown that one of the requirements of section 24C is that the 
income received by or accrued to the taxpayer must be in terms of the same contract from 
which the obligation to perform arises. ITC 1527 further shows that any obligation that 
exists outside the contract, even though it might be related to the obligations in the 
contract, cannot serve as proof that future expenditure will be incurred in the performance 
of the taxpayer’s obligation under a contract.  
 
4.2.2  ITC 1601 58 SATC 172  
The appellant (‘the taxpayer’) carried on the business of process control engineering. This 
entailed the sale of computer hardware and measuring instruments. The taxpayer also 
serviced the hardware, instruments and programs by setting them up to meet the specific 
requirements of each client. The standard conditions of offer and sale (‘the contract’) 
contained a warrant against defective workmanship and materials supplied. It is noted that 
when the taxpayer supplied manufactured goods, it carried the manufacturer’s warranty 
and the taxpayer was not responsible to replace these goods at his own expense.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
67 
 
Included in the sales price of the goods and service was a profit margin to cover cost likely 
to be incurred in terms of the warranty in the contract. The taxpayer presented evidence to 
demonstrate that almost all the contracts required after-sales maintenance, rectification 
and fine-tuning. This was due to the technical nature of the installations.  
 
The taxpayer deducted an allowance under section 24C in his tax return. He argued that 
provision was made in the sales price to cover future expenditure that would be incurred in 
the performance of his obligations under the contract. According to the Commissioner, the 
taxpayer only had a contingent liability and, therefore, the section 24C allowance was not 
allowed. The taxpayer objected to the assessment and, as in the case of ITC 1527, the 
Tax Court had to review the administrative discretion exercised by the Commissioner.  
 
In delivering his judgement, Van Niekerk J, inter alia, held that: 
 
 He agreed that the Commissioner could not be satisfied that expenditure would be 
incurred if there was only a contingent liability.  
  ‘Section 24C was not enacted to provide a deductible reserve fund for possible 
comebacks, unforeseen contingencies or latent defects in the res vendita. This would 
be contrary to the provision of section 23(e) of the Act.’ 
 ‘There must be a clear measure of certainty as to whether the expenditure in 
contention is quantified or quantifiable.’ 
The aforementioned arguments of Van Niekerk J are discussed further in 4.2.2.1 – 4.2.2.4.  
 
Van Niekerk J specifically stated that the Commissioner invited the taxpayer to provide 
additional information to satisfy the Commissioner that the section 24C allowance should 
be allowed, but the taxpayer failed to do so. Although the court was not required to make a 
judgement on whether the section 24C allowance should be allowed, it is evident from the 
arguments of Van Niekerk J that he agreed with the Commissioner in disallowing the 
allowance. Van Niekerk J finally concluded that the Commissioner did exercise proper 
discretion. 
 
4.2.2.1 The contingent liability 
The deductibility of a contingent liability in terms of section 24C came under the radar in 
ITC 1601. As shown in chapter 2.6.1, the words ‘contingent’ and ‘conditional’, as well as 
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the words ‘liability’ and ‘obligation’, can be used as substitutes for each other. Hereafter, 
where the phrase ‘contingent liability’ is used by the courts and other literature, it will be 
assumed that it is similar to a ‘conditional obligation’, as discussed in chapter 3.4.1. 
 
Clegg and Stretch, however, criticised the judgement in ITC 1601 (2011:par 11.11.7). 
Referring to the fact that ‘the Commissioner cannot be satisfied that expenditure will be 
incurred if there is only a contingent liability’, they said:  
 
If expenditure is not contingent, then there will be no need for the section, as 
the liability would be absolute and a deduction under section 11(a) could be 
claimed. The wording requires the Commissioner to be satisfied that 
expenditure ‘will be incurred after the end of such year’, making it clear that it is 
the incurral itself which arises thereafter, and which must, by definition, be 
uncertain and contingent as at the end of the year in question. It is submitted 
that there must be in existence an enforceable and uncontingent obligation to 
perform under a contract, which performance will lead to the incurral of 
expenditure. (own emphasis) 
 
It is argued that the reason that Clegg and Stretch criticised the judgement in ITC 1601 is 
because Van Niekerk J only referred to a contingent liability and did not explain the context 
in which the phrase was used.  
 
As shown in chapter 2.6.4, with reference to case law, when the word ‘incurred’ is used in 
section 11(a) it indicates that the taxpayer has, during the year of assessment, incurred an 
unconditional obligation to pay for expenditure. It was also shown in the context of  
section 11(a), when a taxpayer only has a contingent liability, the expenditure will not be 
deductible under section 11(a). It is on this basis that Clegg and Stretch criticised the 
judgement in ITC 1601, saying that if the liability was not contingent at the end of the year 
of assessment, the taxpayer could claim a deduction under section 11(a) and then there 
would be no need for section 24C.  
 
Section 24C, however, refers to the taxpayer’s obligation to perform under a contract and, 
as shown in chapter 3.4.1, this obligation can be either conditional or unconditional. If a 
taxpayer has a conditional obligation to perform under the contract, no certainty will exist 
that future expenditure will be incurred and the section 24C allowance will not be allowed. 
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Clegg and Stretch, therefore, rightly say that, for the section 24C allowance to be allowed, 
‘there must be in existence an enforceable and uncontingent [unconditional] obligation to 
perform under a contract, which performance will lead to the incurral of expenditure’.  
 
It is, therefore, clear that, when dealing with section 24C, a distinction must be made 
between a contingent liability that is not deductible in terms of section 11(a) and a 
conditional obligation to perform under a contract. It is argued that if Van Niekerk J had 
rather stated that ‘the Commissioner cannot be satisfied that expenditure will be incurred if 
there is only a contingent liability [to perform under the contract]’, it would have been in 
agreement with Clegg and Stretch’s and this assignment’s interpretation of section 24C. 
 
4.2.2.2 Interplay between section 24C, section 23(e) and the contingent liability that 
is not deductible in terms of section 11(a)  
In his judgement, Van Niekerk J referred to the dictum in Pyott Ltd v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue 13 SATC 121 (‘Pyott Ltd v CIR’). In this case, Pyott Ltd sold goods in 
containers and the company was obligated to refund the sales price of the container in the 
event that it was returned to him. The question was whether the provision made to meet 
future claims was deductible in terms of section 11(2) of Act 31 of 1941, a section similar 
to section 11(a) of the Act. The court held that the provision made to meet future claims 
was a contingent liability and consequently disallowed the deduction. It was further held 
that section 12(e) of the Income Tax Act 31 of 1941, a section similar to section 23(e) of 
the Act, expressly prohibits the deduction of reserves created for contingent liabilities.  
 
Section 23(e) of the Act prohibits a deduction of income carried to any reserve fund or 
capitalised in any way. Van Niekerk J also held, by referring to Pyott Ltd v CIR, that  
section 24C is an exception to the general rule12 (the prohibition of the deduction of 
reserves in terms of section 23(e)). He further held that the courts are entitled to adopt a 
strict, rather than a liberal view in their application of section 24C to the facts. The courts 
must, however, still have regard to the specific ambit of section 24C. It is submitted that 
Van Niekerk J thereby implied that the purpose of section 24C is not to elude section 23(e) 
nor to open a door for any contingent liability to be deducted under section 24C. Only once 
                                             
12 It is assumed that Van Niekerk J referred to section 23(e) as the general rule, because he made this 
statement immediately after the reference to section 23(e). 
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the specific requirements of section 24C are met, will an allowance for a reserve be 
allowed under section 24C.  
 
De Koker and Williams (2011:par 7.10) confirm that a contingent liability is an example of a 
deduction prohibited by section 23(e). De Koker and Williams (2011: par 7:47) also state 
that section 24C is an exception to section 23(e), as it permits for the deduction of ‘future 
expenditure’ on contracts. The aforementioned statements by De Koker and Williams and 
Van Niekerk J, namely that section 24C is an exception to section 23(e), should be 
carefully interpreted, especially with reference to the contingent liability. 
 
If the taxpayer has created a reserve for a contingent liability, incurred in the pursuance of 
the performance of his obligation under the contract, the question arises: Is the amount of 
the reserve created for the contingent liability then deductible under section 24C? It 
submitted that the answer is ‘no’, because the section 24C allowance is based on the 
taxpayer’s obligation to perform under the contract and not on the contingent liabilities 
existing at the end of the year of assessment.  
 
To explain the argument, the following example is provided: 
 
In year 1 taxpayer A receives R1 000 from client B in terms of a contract. Taxpayer A has 
an unconditional obligation under the contract to build a structure for client B in year 2. The 
contract price consists of R400 for bricks, R400 for labour and R200 profit for taxpayer A. 
Taxpayer A will buy half of the bricks at the end of year 1 and the other half in year 2. At 
the end of year 1, taxpayer A bought bricks from supplier X for R200, but in terms of the 
supplier’s contract, taxpayer A will only be liable to pay supplier X if he is satisfied with the 
quality of the bricks. Taxpayer A only inspects the bricks in year 2. At the end of  
year 1 taxpayer A, therefore, only has a contingent liability to pay supplier X and the R200 
is not deductible in terms of section 11(a).  
 
When calculating taxpayer A’s section 24C allowance, the allowance is so much of the 
income that will be utilised in whole, or in part, to finance future expenditure which will be 
incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under the contract. In terms 
of the contract, taxpayer A will incur future expenditure to the value of R800 (R400 for 
bricks and R400 for labour) in the performance of his obligation under the contract. The 
section 24C allowance will, therefore, be R800. It is thus clear that the section 24C 
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allowance is based on the unconditional obligation to perform under the contract, and not 
on the existing conditional liability to pay supplier X. The starting point for calculating the  
section 24C allowance is, therefore, the contract which is independent of the taxpayer’s 
existing contingent liabilities at the end of the year of assessment.  
 
It is, therefore, argued that although the section 24C allowance can be equal to or similar 
to a contingent liability incurred by the taxpayer in the pursuance of the performance of his 
obligation under the contract, it is not the contingent liability that is deductible under 
section 24C. The amount deductible under section 24C is an amount that represents all 
the future expenditure that will be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his 
obligation under the contract.  
 
4.2.2.3 The warranty 
In ITC 1601 it was not specifically stated what the Commissioner classified as a contingent 
liability. It is, however, assumed that he referred to the warranty for defective 
workmanship, consisting of after-sales maintenance, rectification and fine-tuning, as 
required by the clients. As discussed in chapter 3.4.2, when a taxpayer is obligated to 
perform in terms of a warranty in a contract, he cannot be certain whether he will have to 
perform and incur future expenditure until the client informs him that his workmanship is 
defective. His obligation to perform in terms of the contract is, therefore, conditional and 
dependent on the occurrence of an uncertain future event. Thus, even though the 
Commissioner in ITC 1601 only referred to a contingent liability that was not deductible 
under section 24C, the taxpayer’s performance under the warranty in the contract was only 
conditional and the section 24C allowance was, therefore, correctly not allowed.  
 
4.2.2.4 Clear measure of certainty that the expenditure is quantified or quantifiable 
Section 24C provides for a deduction of an allowance for future expenditure as opposed to 
a deduction for expenditure actually incurred. Due to the nature of the section 24C 
allowance, unless the contract quantifies the exact amount of future expenditure to be 
incurred by the taxpayer, the taxpayer will not know what the exact amount of future 
expenditure will be until he actually incurs it. Van Niekerk J in ITC 1601 accordingly 
mentioned that the future expenditure must be quantified or quantifiable. He did not 
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explain this argument, and only added, as if to emphasise his argument, that ‘since a 
deduction is sought, this must arise from an obligation and must be quantifiable’.  
 
CIR v Edgars Stores Ltd was a case dealing with the deductibility of expenditure in terms 
of section 11(a). It was held that if an unconditional liability was incurred, but it cannot be 
quantified, then the amount must be estimated based on available information and claimed 
in that tax year. The deduction in terms of section 11(a), therefore, does not depend on 
whether the amount is already quantified. If a reliable estimate of the expenditure can be 
made then the deduction should be allowed.  
 
It is argued that the same principle laid down in CIR v Edgars Stores Ltd should apply in 
section 24C. When an enforceable and unconditional obligation under a contract exists 
and there is certainty that the performance of this obligation will lead to the incurral of 
expenditure, the amount must be estimated if it is not already quantified in the contract. 
From ITC 1527 (refer to 4.2.1) it is, however, clear that the Commissioner must be 
satisfied that this amount is not only based on vague allocations of expenditure. The 
Commissioner will expect a detailed schedule illustrating that there is a definite connection 
between the estimate of future expenditure that will be incurred and the obligation to 
perform under the contract.  
 
It is, accordingly, submitted that the ‘clear measure of certainty as to whether the 
expenditure in contention is quantified or quantifiable’ referred to by Van Niekerk J will be 
obtained when the taxpayer has: 
 
 an unconditional obligation to perform under a contract that will lead to the incurral of 
future expenditure, and  
 the estimate of the amount of future expenditure is based on fair and reasonable 
grounds.  
 
Lastly, it is submitted that if the contract does not quantify the future expenditure to be 
incurred in terms of the contract it will not, in itself, be an indication that the incurral of the 
future expenditure is uncertain.  
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4.2.3 ITC 1667 61 SATC 439  
This case was introduced in chapter 2.3.2, where it was shown that one of the 
requirements of section 24C is that the income must be received by or accrued to the 
taxpayer in terms of the same contract from which the obligation to perform arises. In this 
case, reference is, however, also made to the incurral of future maintenance costs.  
 
The appellant’s (‘the taxpayer’) business was the selling, letting and repairing of office 
equipment. The taxpayer usually concluded two contracts with each client. The first 
contract was a 60-month rental contract, in terms of which the taxpayer received monthly 
rental income. The second contract was a maintenance contract that provided for the 
maintenance of the equipment during the duration of the rental agreement. The taxpayer 
did not receive any additional income in terms of the maintenance agreement, as the 
remuneration was provided for under the rental agreement. After the contracts were 
concluded, the taxpayer discounted the future payments and ceded his rights to future 
rental income to B (a third party) in return for payment from B. In doing so, the taxpayer 
received a lump sum shortly after the rental agreement was concluded. The taxpayer, 
however, remained liable for the maintenance of the equipment over the 60-month period 
in terms of the maintenance contract. 
 
The taxpayer deducted a section 24C allowance in the calculation of his taxable income, 
arguing that he did receive income in terms of a contract and that he would incur future 
expenditure to perform his maintenance obligations under the contract.  
 
The Commissioner disallowed the deduction, and provided the following reasons: 
  
 The incurral of the maintenance expenditure is conditional upon the client using the 
equipment. The rental and the maintenance agreement can be cancelled by the 
client and the future maintenance expenditure is thus uncertain or of a contingent 
nature. The Commissioner referred to ITC 1601 to support this contention. 
 The rental contract and the maintenance contracts were two separate contracts. 
 The taxpayer derived his income from the discounting transaction, which was 
separate to the contract that obligated him to maintain the equipment.  
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The taxpayer objected to each of the Commissioner’s reasons: 
 
 The taxpayer referred to the criticism given by Clegg and Stretch on the judgement in  
ITC 1601 and further argued that it could not have been the Legislator’s intention to 
disallow expenditure under section 24C that was contingent upon an actual 
malfunction occurring. 
 The rental agreement was the cause for the maintenance contract and the 
maintenance contract was intrinsic to the rental agreement.  
 The discounting transaction was directly linked to the rental agreement and, 
therefore, formed an integral part of the scheme.  
 
Blignaut J agreed with Commissioner that the section 24C allowance should not be 
allowed because the income was not received from the same contract that obligated the 
taxpayer to perform. 
 
It should be noted that Blignaut J chose only to conclude on the Commissioner’s third 
reason for not allowing the allowance. He did not indicate whether he agreed with the 
Commissioner that the future maintenance expenditure was uncertain and contingent in 
nature. This is unfortunate, as it could have provided some further insight into the 
determination of whether the incurral of future maintenance costs under a contract is 
certain or uncertain and, therefore, deductible in terms of section 24C, or not. Future 
maintenance cost is discussed further in 4.4. 
 
4.2.4 ITC 1697 63 SATC 146  
This case is the only Tax Case on section 24C in which the taxpayer succeeded in 
convincing the court that the Commissioner’s decision to disallow the section 24C 
allowance was incorrect.  
 
The appellant (‘the taxpayer’) was a shareblock company, operating a time share 
consisting of flats. A Use Agreement existed between the taxpayer, on the one hand, and 
each member that acquired a shareblock, on the other hand. Each member was bound in 
terms of their individual Agreement of Sale to this one Use Agreement (‘the contract’). The 
contract determined that the members were required to pay levies to the taxpayer and the 
taxpayer had certain obligations that he had to fulfil.  
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The taxpayer’s obligations in terms of the contract were clearly defined and included, inter 
alia, the repair, upkeep, renovation, control, management and administration of the 
company, the property and the immovable property, including all the flats, and the 
payment of any obligations of the company in connection with the aforementioned. The 
directors had to estimate, annually, the amount which was required to meet the 
aforementioned obligations and, accordingly, determine the levy amount that each 
member had to pay. The contract also determined that the levy could include an amount to 
be held at reserve to meet any anticipated future expenditure that was not of an annual 
nature, such as expenditure to be incurred for the redecoration or renovation of the 
company’s property and the replacement of movable property. At the annual general 
meeting, the financial director of the company had to provide a detailed budget for the 
following three years, listing all the items, for annual and non-annual expenditure, relating 
to the administration of the scheme and for the maintenance of the fixed and movable 
property.  
 
The budget included a list that carefully predicted when and in which year the non-annual 
expenditure would become payable. This was important, because the members did not 
have the right to furnish and maintain the units themselves. The taxpayer, therefore, 
estimated when certain items in the units would reach the end of their life, and then 
budgeted to replace all similar items in all the units at the same time. Thus, the taxpayer 
fulfilled his obligations in terms of the contract uniformly and not randomly.  
 
According to the taxpayer, these aforementioned obligations, for both annual and non-
annual expenditure, led to the incurral of future expenditure and he, therefore, claimed the 
section 24C allowance against the levy income received in terms of the contract. 
 
The Commissioner disallowed the allowance based on two reasons: 
 
 The incurral of the future expenditure is left to the discretion of the directors and, 
therefore, the obligation to incur future expenditure does not arise from the contract. 
 The contract does not make it possible for the Commissioner to make a reasonable 
estimate of the quantum of the future expenditure. 
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Galgut J addressed the Commissioner’s contentions as follows: 
 
 ‘The contract is an ongoing agreement, which creates a set of rights and obligations 
which will arise in each and every year’. He stated that the fact that the directors 
have discretion to provide for whatever becomes necessary to maintain or replace 
fixed or immovable property, does not change the fact that it is the contract that 
determines the taxpayer’s obligation to perform. 
 
 Although the contract does not specify the quantum of the future expenditure, the 
directors have the discretion to decide when and how the obligations will be fulfilled. 
Each year’s budget accordingly carefully estimates the amount of expenditure that 
will be incurred to fulfil the obligation under the contract. Galgut J referred to  
ITC 1601 where it was stated that ‘there must be a clear measure of certainty as to 
whether the expenditure in contention is quantified or quantifiable’. Galgut J 
compared the current case with ITC 1601, saying that in ITC 1601 the future 
expenditure was contingent, because it might never arise. In this case, however, the 
taxpayer’s liability for the future expenditure was far from contingent, it was 
unconditional and the amount was certain.  
 
He further referred to CIR v Edgars Stores where it was held that in situations where 
the quantum of the amount is not specified in the contract, it should be estimated 
based on what is fair and reasonable. 
 
Galgut J also stated that, when referring to a ‘contract’ in section 24C and when it is said 
that the liability must be unconditional in terms of the contract, it does not refer to a 
contract which the taxpayer might conclude with a supplier in the pursuance of the 
performance of his obligation under the contract. The contract refers to the contract in 
terms of which the taxpayer received income and under which he has an obligation to 
perform and this obligation to perform must, accordingly, be unconditional. This is in 
agreement with what Clegg and Stretch observed when commenting on ITC 1601 (refer to 
4.2.2.1).  
 
The appeal succeeded and the deduction in terms of section 24C was allowed. Three 
matters came to the foreground that require further discussion. 
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4.2.4.1 The discretion of the directors to affect performance under the contract 
According to Galgut J’s argument in ITC 1697, when the directors of a company have the 
discretion to decide when and how the taxpayer’s obligation under the contract should be 
performed, the obligation to perform is still in terms of the contract and not in terms of the 
directors’ decisions.  
 
It is argued that if the directors have the discretion to decide when and how the taxpayer’s 
obligation under the contract should be performed, it indicates that there is no uncertainty 
regarding whether the obligation must be performed. There is certainty regarding the 
taxpayer’s obligation to perform under the contract and the directors’ discretion merely 
give effect to the performance of the obligation. This is similar to a time clause, as 
discussed in chapter 3.4.3. If parties insert a time clause in a contract, their intention is not 
to make the performance subject to the occurrence of an uncertain future event. They are 
certain that the performance must be rendered, although the timing of the performance is 
not certain. In this case, the taxpayer’s obligation to perform was certain, but the timing 
and manner of the performance was left to the discretion of the directors. 
 
4.2.4.2 Quantifiable expenditure 
From ITC 1697 it is clear that if a contract does not specify the quantum of the expenditure 
that the taxpayer must incur in order to fulfil his obligation under the contract, the amount 
of the allowance can still be quantified based on a fair and reasonable estimate. ITC 1697, 
however, clearly shows that these estimates should be detailed and they should correlate 
with the specific obligation that the taxpayer has under the contract. This is in agreement 
with the conclusion in ITC 1527 (refer to 4.2.1.1), where the taxpayer attempted to allocate 
general overhead expenditure to the section 24C allowance, but failed to do so, because 
such allocation of the expenditure did not correlate with the obligations under the contract. 
 
4.2.4.3 Future maintenance costs 
An interesting element of the judgement in ITC 1697 is that it allowed a deduction for 
future maintenance costs. Galgut J, however, specifically stated that, in this case, the 
obligation to perform was unconditional. The following questions can, however, be posed 
regarding the maintenance cost: What determines whether maintenance, renovation or the 
replacement of movable property will be required? Could there be uncertainty as to 
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whether the aforementioned maintenance will be required? For example, the extent of 
maintenance might be considerably greater if a storm damages the building, than if there 
is no severe damage due to unforeseen circumstances. This triggers the question of 
whether maintenance, renovation or the replacement of movable property is, in fact, 
subject to damage being suffered, or to the fact that something must break, and therefore 
conditional? As seen from ITC 1667 in 4.2.3, the Commissioner contended that the 
incurral of the maintenance expenditure under the maintenance contract was conditional 
upon the client using the equipment. The taxpayer’s obligation to performance under the 
contact was, therefore, uncertain or of a contingent nature. In ITC 1667 the judge did, 
however, not comment on this and it was, therefore, uncertain whether he agreed or 
disagreed that the taxpayer’s performance under the maintenance contract was contingent 
in nature and that the taxpayer only had a conditional obligation to perform under the 
maintenance contract. 
 
In ITC 1697 the contract was, however, described as an ongoing agreement. Every year 
the directors determined what the necessary maintenance, renovations or the replacement 
of movable property was and, accordingly, how much the related expenditure would be 
and what the levy amount payable by the shareholders should be. Therefore, when the 
levies were received, there was certainty about the expenditure to be incurred in a 
subsequent year of assessment. This ongoing agreement could have been the taxpayer’s 
saving grace in ITC 1697. Maintenance contracts are discussed further in 4.4. 
  
4.2.5 ITC 1739 65 SATC 43 
This tax case and the criticism on this judgement have already been discussed in  
chapter 2.5 with specific reference to the meaning of the word ‘expenditure’. In  
ITC 1739 reference is, however, also made to a ‘warranty’ in the contract and the facts 
are, therefore, presented here again:  
 
The taxpayer was a manufacturer of certain products (held as trading stock) which were 
sold with a manufacturer’s warranty to various motor assembly plants. The motor 
assembly plants are referred to as original equipment manufacturers (‘OEM’). The OEM, in 
turn, supplied completed vehicles to dealers and distributors. In the event of a warranty 
claim, the OEM would claim the parts necessary for the repair of the vehicle from the 
taxpayer. The taxpayer wished to utilise the section 24C allowance, but the Commissioner 
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disallowed the taxpayer’s claim on the basis that it was a warranty claim and, therefore, a 
contingent liability.  
 
The taxpayer appealed to the Tax Court, arguing that when determining the price for his 
products he, inter alia, considered the terms of the manufacturer’s warranty since he, in 
the event of a claim, would incur a cost to honour his obligation under the warranty in the 
contract.  
 
In his judgement, Joffe J did not indicate whether the future expenditure to be incurred in 
terms of the warranty in the contract was indeed only contingent in nature, but he 
disallowed the deduction, based on the fact that the cost to honour the obligation under the 
warranty in the contract represented a loss and not ‘expenditure’13. 
 
4.2.5.1 The warranty 
Based on chapter 3.4.2, it is suggested that the Commissioner was, indeed, correct in 
arguing that the warranty only led to a contingent liability. He, however, only made 
reference to a contingent liability. This should have been rephrased as the contingent 
liability was specifically in terms of the contract or, stated otherwise, the obligation to 
perform under the contract was conditional. If a contract contains a warranty, the taxpayer 
cannot be certain that he will be liable to compensate the client for damages until the client 
indicates that the item is, indeed, defective.  
 
4.2.6 Special Board Decision No. 12914 
The appellant (‘the taxpayer’) sold policies and earned commission on all his sales. The 
taxpayer had an obligation to refund the commission if the policies were cancelled within 
two years. The taxpayer estimated, based on the cancellation history, his expected 
obligation to refund the commission, and deducted a section 24C allowance for this future 
expenditure from the commission income received.  
                                             
13 Whether closing stock on hand can be included as ‘future expenditure’ in terms of section 24C will be 
discussed in further detail in chapter 5.4. 
14 Tax appeals, in the first instance, are heard either by the Tax Board or the Tax Court (SARS:2014). Tax 
Board Decisions, previously known as Special Board Decisions, are issued by the Tax Board and are 
binding on the parties, but do not create a precedent.  
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The Commissioner disallowed the deduction, stating that he was not satisfied that the 
amount would necessarily be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his 
obligations under the contract. 
 
Rosenberg, the Chairman of the Board, held that the expected obligation was only a 
contingent liability and that the obligation to refund the commission had not yet vested. It 
was also held that the fact that reliable data was available to enable a reasonably accurate 
projection of cancellation figures did not change the character of the obligation. The 
obligation of the taxpayer remained contingent in relation to each individual policy. The 
section 24C allowance was, accordingly, not allowed. 
 
4.2.6.1 Collective obligations  
In chapter 3.4.1 it was shown from Nasionale Pers Bpk v KBI that a taxpayer cannot group 
similar contracts with similar conditional obligations together to determine the probability 
that future expenditure will be incurred in the performance of the taxpayer’s obligations 
under the contracts. Further, in chapter 3.1, it was also shown that a taxpayer cannot 
argue that, to discharge his burden of proof, he must only prove that the incurral of future 
expenditure in terms of a contract is probable.  
 
Rosenberg, therefore, also correctly held that each individual obligation should be 
considered to determine whether the section 24C requirements are met. As long as the 
obligation to perform under the individual contract is conditional, the requirements of 
section 24C remain unmet.  
 
4.3 Binding Private Rulings (‘BPR’) 
A BPR is issued by the Commissioner in response to a specific proposed transaction and 
states how the Commissioner would interpret and apply the provisions of the tax laws in 
relation to the transaction (SARS:2014(1)). It is only binding on that particular transaction 
and usually only valid for a specified period. A published BPR provides only limited 
information regarding the proposed transactions, but it nevertheless provides insight into 
the Commissioner’s interpretation of certain provisions.  
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4.3.1 BPR 6: The application of section 24C in the context of a repair and 
maintenance contract 
The proposed transaction was as follows: The taxpayer manufactured and sold assets that 
required repairs and maintenance. He would enter into a separate repair and maintenance 
contract (‘the contract’) with each client. The contract was specifically not a warranty, but 
covered the known and anticipated repair and maintenance costs of the asset, for an 
agreed fee that was payable on a monthly basis by the client. The monthly fee was 
calculated based on the anticipated costs of repairs and maintenance, which the taxpayer 
was obliged to perform in relation to such asset in terms of the contract.  
 
According to BPR 6, the taxpayer was entitled to a section 24C allowance in respect of the 
fees accruing under the contract. It is interesting to note that no distinction was made by 
the Commissioner between contingent maintenance costs and unconditional maintenance 
costs. Also refer to 4.4 for further discussion on future maintenance costs. 
 
4.3.2 BPR 106: Application of section 24C to a maintenance trust 
The proposed transaction was as follows: The taxpayer was a trust that would be 
responsible for the maintenance of the burial grounds at a private cemetery. Clients who 
wanted to be buried at the cemetery would pay a fee to Company A in terms of a burial 
agreement for a final resting right at the cemetery. At the same time, they would pay a fee, 
in terms of the burial agreement, to the trust for the maintenance of the burial grounds. 
The trust had to, in terms of the burial agreement, maintain the grounds in perpetuity and 
would incur the maintenance costs as, and when, required.  
 
According to BPR 106, the taxpayer was entitled to a section 24C allowance in respect of 
his obligation under the burial agreement. The future maintenance expenditure was, 
therefore, deductible. This ruling, however, specifically stated that is was not applicable in 
relation to expenses of a contingent nature. No indication was given as to which expenses 
in the proposed transaction would be classified as contingent in nature. Refer to 4.4 for 
further discussion on future maintenance costs. 
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4.4 Repair and maintenance contracts – contingent or unconditional?  
In the light of BPR 6, BPR 106 and the judgements in ITC 1601, ITC 1697 and ITC 1739, it 
seems that future maintenance costs can be categorised into three groups: 
 
 Under a maintenance and repair contract, the taxpayer can have an unconditional 
obligation to maintain and repair specified assets, in which event his obligation is 
certain, even though the timing of the performance is uncertain or subject to the 
discretion of the directors. If the contract does not specify the quantum of the future 
maintenance and repair cost, it should be estimated based on fair and reasonable 
grounds. The future maintenance costs are known or can be anticipated, as shown in 
ITC 1697 and BPR 6. A section 24C allowance will, therefore, be allowed for future 
maintenance costs to be incurred in the aforementioned circumstances. 
 
 The terms of the maintenance and repair contracts can determine that the taxpayer is 
only required to repair or maintain the assets in the event of malfunction, damage or 
breakage. This is similar to a warranty in a contract that can obligate a taxpayer to 
perform specified maintenance and repairs on an asset in the event that the asset or 
services rendered are defective (ITC 1601 and ITC 1739). As shown in 3.4.1 and 
3.4.2, the taxpayer’s obligation will be conditional upon the occurrence of an 
uncertain future event and, therefore, a section 24C allowance will not be allowed for 
estimated future repair and maintenance costs.  
 
 The terms of the maintenance and repair contracts can also indicate that the 
taxpayer has both conditional and unconditional obligations to perform under the 
same contract (BPR 106). As shown in 3.3.3.2 if the nature of the performances 
required to fulfil the obligations under the contract and the intention of the parties 
indicate that there are more than one indivisible performance in terms of the contract, 
each indivisible performance should be identified. Thus, if some of the performances 
required to fulfil the taxpayer’s obligation under the contract are conditional upon the 
happening of an uncertain future event, the section 24C allowance will not be allowed 
for the related future expenditure.  
 
The terms of maintenance and repair contracts should be carefully read to determine the 
nature of the performances required to fulfill the obligations under the contract and 
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whether these performances are conditional or unconditional, as this will influence the 
deductibility of the future expenditure under section 24C.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Chapter 4 showed that certain circumstances will indicate whether there is certainty that 
future expenditure will be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations 
under a contract. 
 
The courts have confirmed that there must be a definite connection between the 
taxpayer’s performance of his obligation under the contract and the incurral of future 
expenditure. General overhead expenditure cannot be allocated as part of the section 24C 
allowance, unless it can be shown that it directly relates to the obligation under the 
contract. 
 
The performance of the obligation that will lead to the incurral of future expenditure must 
be in terms of the same contract from which income was received by, or accrued to, the 
taxpayer. The obligation under the contract does not include obligations that exist outside 
the contract, even though they might be related to the obligations in the contract. 
 
A distinction must be made between a contingent liability that is not deductible in terms of 
section 11(a) and a conditional obligation to perform under a contract. The section 24C 
requirements will not be met if the taxpayer only has a conditional obligation to perform 
under a contract. Whether the section 24C requirements are met should, therefore, not be 
tested against the existence of a contingent liability that is not deductible under  
section 11(a), but against the obligation to perform under the contract, which must be 
unconditional and which must lead to the incurral of future expenditure. 
 
Section 24C is an exception to section 23(e), provided that any reserve for ‘future 
expenditure’ meets all the requirements in terms of section 24C and the amount of the 
reserve is calculated in terms of section 24C.  
 
A warranty in a contract indicates that a taxpayer only has a conditional obligation to 
perform under a contract, and the section 24C allowance will, therefore, not be allowed for 
future expenditure relating to the warranty. 
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Unquantified future expenditure to be incurred in terms of a contract, will not indicate that 
the incurral of the future expenditure is uncertain. If the taxpayer has an unconditional 
obligation to perform under a contract and the amount is quantifiable, provided all other 
requirements of section 24C are met, the section 24C allowance will be allowed. If the 
amount is not already quantified in the contract, the estimate of the amount of future 
expenditure must be based on fair and reasonable grounds.  
 
When the directors of a company have the discretion to decide when and how the 
taxpayer’s unconditional obligation under the contract should be performed, the obligation 
to perform remains in terms of the contract and it is only the actual performance of the 
obligation that is subject to the directors’ discretion. Therefore, the taxpayer’s obligation to 
perform is certain and it is only the manner and timing of the performance that are 
uncertain, because they are dependent on the directors’ discretion. 
 
Similar contracts with conditional obligations to perform cannot be grouped together to 
determine the probability that future expenditure will be incurred. Historical data, indicating 
the probability that future expenditure will be incurred under a contract, does not change a 
conditional obligation to perform under the contract to an unconditional obligation to 
perform under the contract. 
 
The terms of maintenance and repair contracts should be carefully read to determine 
whether they represent a conditional obligation to only repair or maintain an asset in 
specified circumstances, whether the taxpayer is unconditionally obligated to maintain and 
repair certain assets, or whether the contract contains both conditional and unconditional 
obligations to maintain and repair assets. Only when the taxpayer’s performance of his 
obligations are unconditional will there be certainty regarding the incurral or the related 
future expenditure, and provided that all other requirements of section 24C are met, will a 
section 24C allowance be allowed.  
 
SARS recently issued a IN 78 to explain their interpretation of  
section 24C. In chapter 5, any new guidelines introduced by IN 78, relating to this 
assignment’s established interpretation of section 24C, will be discussed.  
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CHAPTER 5: NEW GUIDELINES PROVIDED FOR BY IN 78 RELATING TO THIS 
ASSIGNMENT’S ESTABLISHED INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 24C 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 established, with reference to this assignment’s first two research 
questions, and based on court cases, academic writing and other material: 
 
 The meaning of the word ‘expenditure’, as used in section 24C. 
 Indicators that will serve to demonstrate whether future expenditure will be incurred 
by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under the contract.  
 
In July 2014 SARS issued Interpretation Note: No. 78, Allowance for future expenditure on 
contracts (‘IN 78’) (SARS, 2014(3)) providing guidelines on the interpretation of section 
24C. An Interpretation Note is SARS’s interpretation of a provision in the Act and it does 
not have the force of law (Stiglingh et al., 2014:13). A taxpayer may, therefore, challenge 
the practice of SARS, as set out in an Interpretation Note, if he disagrees with the 
interpretation.  
 
In this chapter, any guidelines, provided for by IN 78, but which were not already 
discussed in chapter 2, 3 or 4, are discussed with specific reference to: 
 
 The meaning of the word ‘expenditure’, as used in section 24C; and 
 Indicators that will serve to demonstrate whether future expenditure will be incurred 
by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under the contract.  
 
Shortcomings to these guidelines are emphasised and, if necessary, suggestions 
regarding these guidelines are provided.  
 
In addition, in chapter 2.5 it was shown, with reference to the evaluating commentary by 
JutaLaw on ITC 1739, that some uncertainty exists as to whether trading stock held by the 
taxpayer at the end of the year of assessment, that will be utilised by the taxpayer in the 
performance of his obligation under a contract, will qualify as ‘future expenditure’ in terms 
of section 24C(1). IN 78, however, states that the aforementioned does not represent 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
87 
 
‘future expenditure’ and this chapter, therefore, ends with a discussion of the interplay 
between section 24C and trading stock.  
 
5.2 Expenditure  
Paragraph 4.2.1(a) of IN 78 states that it is important to distinguish between expenditure 
and losses, because the two are different and section 24C only applies to ‘future 
expenditure’. IN 78 discusses the meaning of the word ‘expenditure’ with reference to 
authoritative court cases and no new guidance on the meaning of the word ‘expenditure’ is 
provided for by IN 78.  
 
IN 78 also refers to court cases where a distinction was made between ‘expenditure’ and 
‘losses’. It refers to Joffe & Co (Pty) Ltd v CIR where Watermeyer CJ explained the 
difference between ‘losses’ and ‘expenditure’. Watermeyer CJ held that, in relation to 
trading operations, expenditure usually means the voluntary payment of money, whereas 
losses is sometimes used to signify a deprivation suffered by the loser, usually an 
involuntary deprivation. IN 78, however, does not refer to Watermeyer CJ’s next argument, 
as discussed in chapter 2.5.1, where it was shown that in certain circumstances a loss can 
be equated with the meaning of the word ‘expenditure’.  
 
IN 78 further refers to COT v Rendle 26 SATC 326. In this case, a distinction was made 
between designed expenditure, representing money voluntarily spent and fortuitous 
expenditure, representing ‘money involuntarily spent because of some mischance or 
misfortune which has overtaken the taxpayer’. IN 78, however, does not indicate how this 
case should be interpreted in the light of section 24C. It is thus not certain whether  
IN 78 argues that: 
 
 Fortuitous expenditure should be equated to ‘losses’ and is, therefore, not deductible 
under section 24C, or  
 Fortuitous expenditure is still money spent and is, therefore, deductible under section 
24C.  
 
Thus, although IN 78 clearly states that section 24C is only applicable to future 
expenditure, and it provides guidelines to the meaning of the word ‘expenditure’, the 
following shortcomings are identified: 
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 It is not clear whether SARS is of the opinion that fortuitous expenditure or money 
involuntarily spent is a loss and, therefore, not deductible under section 24C; and 
 IN 78 does not specify whether a loss which can, in certain circumstances, be 
equated to the word ‘expenditure’, as was shown by Watermeyer CJ, is deductible 
under section 24C. 
 
It is suggested that IN 78 needs to be amended to provide clarity in this regard. 
 
5.3 Indicators that will serve to demonstrate that future expenditure will be 
incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under the 
contract.  
Paragraph 4.2.1(b) of IN 78 discusses, under the heading ‘will be incurred in a subsequent 
year of assessment’ the phrase ‘will be incurred’ and the fact that the incurral must flow 
from the taxpayer’s obligation to perform under the contract.  
 
According to paragraph 4.2.1(b) of IN 78, the phrase will be incurred in a subsequent year 
of assessment indicates that: 
 
[T]he Commissioner must be satisfied that there is a high degree of probability 
and inevitability that the expenditure will be incurred by the taxpayer. A taxpayer 
must, therefore, be able to demonstrate that, although the expenditure is 
contingent at the end of the year of assessment in question, there is a high 
degree of certainty that the expense will in fact be incurred in a subsequent year 
of assessment (SARS, 2014(3):9). (own emphasis) 
 
From the aforementioned, it seems that a taxpayer will obtain a high degree of certainty 
that the expenditure will be incurred in a subsequent year of assessment if he can prove 
that there is a high degree of probability and inevitability that the expenditure will be so 
incurred. 
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IN 78 also states that: 
 
[It is] not possible to specify the industries or particular circumstances in which 
the taxpayer will always be able to demonstrate and prove the required level of 
certainty. 
 
[T]he degree of certainty required is unlikely to be met if the performance is not 
contractually obligatory but is only potentially contractually obligatory because 
of an act or event other than just the taxpayer’s client or customer taking action 
(SARS, 2014(3):10). (own emphasis) 
 
From paragraph 4.2.1(b) of IN 78 it seems that IN 78 provides the following new indicators 
that will serve to demonstrate that future expenditure will be incurred by the taxpayer in the 
performance of his obligations under the contract: 
 
 A high degree of probability and inevitability must exist that the expenditure will be 
incurred by the taxpayer, which will indicate that there is a high degree of certainty 
that the expenditure will in fact be incurred in a subsequent year of assessment. 
 The taxpayer’s performance cannot only be potentially contractually obligatory, 
because of an act or event other than just the taxpayer’s client or customer taking 
action. 
 
IN 78 gives the following example that provides insight into the meaning of the phrases a 
high degree of probability, inevitability and certainty that expenditure will be incurred and a 
potential contractual obligation to perform under a contract.  
 
In the case of a construction contract under which a builder is contractually 
required to build a house which includes tiling the floors (that is, performance is 
obligatory), the cost of the tiles will be included in the future expenditure 
calculation. The degree of certainty required to satisfy the Commissioner that 
the expenditure will be incurred exists in such a situation. The fact that the 
customer has not yet decided on, for example, the colour of the tiles at the end 
of the year of assessment does not, per se, disturb the degree of certainty, 
although it may affect the quantification of the amount of future expenditure if 
the cost of the tiles is dependent on the colour chosen. 
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Generally an obligation to perform remains unconditional when performance is 
merely dependent on the customer taking action (for example, the customer 
choosing the colour of the tiles), but not when performance is dependent on 
further events which may or may not occur.  
 
At principle level, whether the costs are variable or fixed, or of an operational or 
infrastructural nature is not critical; what is important is that the costs flow from 
an unconditional obligation to perform under the contract, which gave rise to the 
advance income and that the Commissioner is satisfied that the expenditure will 
be incurred in a subsequent year of assessment. (SARS, 2014(3):10). (own 
emphasis) 
 
Although IN 78 provides the aforementioned example, it does not define the words 
‘inevitability’ and ‘probability’ or the phrases ‘a high degree’ and ‘potentially contractually 
obligatory’. These words has also not been previously introduced in court cases on  
section 24C, the Explanatory Memorandum or in section 24C itself. The question therefore 
arises whether these words and phrases, if they are not defined in IN 78, might cause 
confusion when interpreting section 24C? 
 
The meaning of words and phrases ‘inevitability’, ‘probability’, ‘certainty’ and ‘a high 
degree’ will be discussed in 5.3.1 and the meaning of the phrase ‘potentially contractually 
obligatory’ will be discussed in 5.3.2. It will be determined whether these words and 
phrases are in actual fact new indicators as to whether there is certainty that expenditure 
will be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under the contract.  
 
5.3.1 ‘Inevitability’, ‘probability’, ‘certainty’ and ‘a high degree’ 
5.3.1.1 Inevitability 
The word ‘inevitable’ is described as:  
 
That cannot be avoided; not admitting of escape or evasion; unavoidable. In 
extended use: that cannot fail or is bound to occur, appear, be used, etc.; that is 
inherent (in) or naturally belongs to (OED, 2014:inevitable). 
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In the context of section 24C, the word inevitable indicates that the incurral of the 
expenditure in a subsequent year of assessment cannot be avoided. It is submitted that 
when a taxpayer has an unconditional obligation to perform under a contract, which will 
lead to the incurral of expenditure (as discussed in chapter 3.4.1), the expenditure will be 
inevitable. Thus, although the word inevitable is used for the first time in the context of 
section 24C, it does not introduce a new indicator as to whether there is certainty that the 
future expenditure will be incurred. It confirms the established interpretation regarding 
unconditionality in chapter 3.4.1. 
 
5.3.1.2 Probability 
The word ‘probable’ is described as:  
 
Having an appearance of truth; that may in view of present evidence be 
reasonably expected to happen or be the case; likely (OED, 2014:probable). 
 
In the context of section 24C, the word probable, therefore, indicates that it is likely or 
reasonably expected that the expenditure will be incurred in a subsequent year of 
assessment. Thus, the taxpayer must, apart from showing that he has an unconditional 
obligation to perform under a contract, also show that the incurral of the future expenditure 
can be reasonably expected.  
 
IN 78 states that when the taxpayer’s performance under a contract is unconditional, but is 
dependent on the customer taking action, the obligation to perform remains unconditional. 
However, the probability that the customer will take action must be considered. 
 
5.3.1.2.1   The probability that the customer will take action 
According to IN 78, a taxpayer might have a legal obligation to perform under a contract, 
but at a certain point in time, the Commissioner might no longer be satisfied that the 
obligation will ever be performed. IN 78 uses gift vouchers as an example. If a taxpayer 
receives income when selling a gift voucher, he has an unconditional obligation to perform 
in terms of the gift voucher, but the performance is dependent on the customer redeeming 
the gift voucher. According to IN 78, historical data can show, for example, that if a gift 
voucher is not redeemed in two years it will never be redeemed. In such circumstances, 
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the Commissioner will, after two years, not be satisfied that it is probable that the taxpayer 
will incur future expenditure and, therefore, the section 24C allowance will not be allowed 
again. In the event that the incurral of the future expenditure is not probable, the required 
degree of certainty that the expenditure will be incurred will, accordingly, also not be met. 
 
The concept of probability, with specific reference to the probability that the customer will 
take action, is thus a new indicator, not previously discussed in this assignment, which can 
serve to demonstrate whether the taxpayer will perform his obligation under the contract 
and whether the related future expenditure will be incurred. It is, however, submitted that 
the probability that expenditure will be incurred can only be considered once it has been 
established that there is an unconditional obligation to perform under a contract. As shown 
in chapter 4.2.6, the taxpayer was not allowed to use historical data to determine the 
probability that a conditional obligation would realise and, thereby, argue that it was 
probable that the expenditure would be incurred in a subsequent year of assessment. 
 
5.3.1.3 Certainty 
From 5.3.1.1 and 5.3.1.2 it is concluded that, when a taxpayer can prove that he has an 
unconditional obligation to perform under the contract (performance is inevitable), and it is 
reasonably expected that he will perform under the contract (performance is probable), 
there will be certainty regarding the performance and the related incurral of future 
expenditure.  
 
5.3.1.4 High degree 
IN 78 states that there must be a high degree of probability and inevitability and a high 
degree of certainty that the expenditure will be incurred in a subsequent year of 
assessment. Exactly what is meant by high degree, and how it should be measured, are 
not elaborated on in IN 78.  
 
It is argued that, in the context of section 24C, ‘a degree of certainty’ can, inter alia, refer to 
the level of confidence that a taxpayer or the Commissioner has that the expenditure will 
be incurred in a subsequent year of assessment. A ‘high degree’ will accordingly refer to a 
high level of confidence that the expenditure will be incurred in a subsequent year of 
assessment. It is, however, argued that the measurement of this ‘high degree’ can easily 
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become subjective and, therefore, objective guidance to determine when a high degree 
will be obtained, should be provided by SARS.  
 
It is, accordingly, suggested that IN 78 should expand on what is meant by a ‘high degree’ 
and how it will be measured. 
 
5.3.2 Potential contractual obligation to perform under the contract 
The question arises whether the reference in IN 78 to a potential contractual obligation to 
perform under a contract is similar to, or different from, a conditional obligation to perform 
under a contract, as described in chapter 3.4.1. 
IN 78, paragraph 4.2.1(b), uses the following two phrases to indicate when a taxpayer will 
not be able satisfy the Commissioner that the future expenditure will be incurred: 
 
 a performance that is potentially contractually obligatory;  
 a performance that is dependent on further events which may or may not occur. This 
is described in chapter 3.4.1 as a conditional obligation under a contract. 
 
IN 78, paragraph 4.2.1(b), indicates that a taxpayer will be able to satisfy the 
Commissioner that the future expenditure will be incurred if: 
 
 the taxpayer’s performance under a contract is obligatory, although dependent on the 
client taking action. This will indicate that the degree of certainty required to satisfy 
the Commissioner that the expenditure will be incurred, does exist. 
 the costs will flow from an unconditional obligation to perform under the contract 
which gave rise to the advance income and the Commissioner is satisfied that the 
expenditure will be incurred in a subsequent year of assessment. 
 
It is, accordingly, submitted that if a taxpayer’s performance is only potentially contractually 
obligatory, it means the same as when a taxpayer only has a conditional obligation to 
perform under a contract. This is opposed to an unconditional obligation to perform under 
the contract referred to in IN 78. In chapter 3.4.1 it was established that an unconditional 
obligation to perform under a contract is an indicator that there is certainty that future 
expenditure will be incurred. 
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It is, however, suggested that, in order to avoid confusion, IN 78 should rather refer to a 
conditional obligation to perform under a contract, than to a taxpayer’s performance that is 
only potentially contractually obligatory. The use of the phrase conditional obligation to 
perform under a contract will be more consistent with the reference in IN 78 to its opposite, 
namely an unconditional obligation to perform under a contract.  
 
5.4  Interplay between trading stock and section 24C 
Paragraphs 4.2.3, 4.2.5 and 7.1 of IN 78 make it clear that SARS is of the opinion that 
trading stock on hand at the end of the year of assessment, which will be utilised by a 
taxpayer in a subsequent year of assessment in the performance of his obligation under a 
contract, will not be included in the section 24C allowance as ‘future expenditure’.  
 
As shown in chapter 2.5, Joffe J disallowed the section 24C allowance in ITC 1739 (refer 
to chapter 2.5 for a discussion of the facts of the case), because the taxpayer incurred a 
loss as opposed to expenditure when using trading stock to replace defective parts which 
were sold under a warranty to customers15. However, JutaLaw provided an evaluative 
commentary on ITC 1739 (Case no. 10723). JutaLaw stated that the cost incurred by the 
taxpayer to manufacture the trading stock represented expenditure. Section 22(1), 
however, provides that the value of closing trading stock at year end must be included in 
the calculation of the taxable income of the taxpayer. Therefore, the expenditure regarding 
closing trading stock is effectively not yet deducted for tax purposes at the end of the year 
of assessment. According to JutaLaw, based on the aforementioned, there is scope for a 
view that when the manufacturer uses this trading stock to meet his warranty obligation in 
a subsequent year of assessment, he will incur ‘future expenditure’.  
 
Although ITC 1739 was applicable to a conditional obligation to perform under a contract, 
and the section 24C allowance was therefore correctly not allowed, a valid question that 
arises from JutaLaw’s comments is: Can trading stock on hand at the end of the year of 
assessment, which will be utilised by a taxpayer in a subsequent year of assessment in 
the performance of his unconditional obligation under the contract, be included as ‘future 
expenditure’, in terms of section 24C?  
                                             
15 It has already been established in chapter 3.4.2 that if the taxpayer’s performance under a warranty 
contact is conditional, the section 24C allowance will not be allowed. 
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An example of a situation where this question will be relevant is when a taxpayer sells gift 
vouchers, which is redeemable for goods (trading stock) in his store. The taxpayer 
receives the income in advance and has an unconditional obligation to perform his 
obligation under the gift voucher contract, by providing the client who is redeeming the 
voucher, with trading stock. The client can either redeem the gift voucher in the year 
during which the gift voucher was purchased or in a subsequent year of assessment. If he 
redeems the gift voucher in a subsequent year of assessment, he can either redeem it out 
of trading stock that was acquired in the subsequent year of assessment or out of trading 
stock that was already acquired at the end of the previous year of assessment. The 
application of section 24C to the latter, must, in the light of the aforementioned question, 
be considered.  
 
The aforementioned question will be evaluated based on this assignment’s established 
interpretation of section 24C, as well as with reference to the provisions that regulate the 
deduction of trading stock. 
 
5.4.1 Future expenditure that will be incurred 
Section 24C(1) defines ‘future expenditure’ in relation to any year of assessment. With 
specific reference to section 24C(1)(a), a taxpayer must satisfy the Commissioner that:  
 
 the incurral of the expenditure will be after the end of the year of assessment in which 
income was received by or accrued to the taxpayer in terms of the contract, as shown 
in chapter 2.3.1 (section 24C(1)), and 
 the amount will be allowed as a deduction from income in a subsequent year of 
assessment (section 24C(1)(a)).  
 
Based on this assignment’s established interpretation of section 24C, it is clear that 
although trading stock represents ‘expenditure’ (chapter 2.5), the trading stock on hand at 
the end of the year of assessment will not meet all the other the requirements of  
section 24C(1). This is because the expenditure for the trading stock is already actually 
incurred at the end of the year of assessment. Actually incurred implies that the taxpayer 
has already paid for the trading stock or has an unconditional legal obligation to pay for the 
trading stock (refer to chapter 2.6 for a discussion of actually incurred). Therefore, the 
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incurral of the expenditure cannot be after the end of the year of assessment in which 
income was received by or accrued to the taxpayer in terms of the contract, as required by 
section 24C(1). The amount, therefore, does not represent ‘future expenditure’. This is in 
agreement with SARS’s interpretation in paragraph 4.2.3, 4.2.5 and 7.1 of IN 78.  
 
Paragraph 7.1 of IN 78 specifically states that, when determining the amount of the section 
24C allowance, it should be assessed whether any cost or income should be excluded 
from the section 24C allowance. IN 78 lists, for example, depreciation and finance costs 
and it specifically states that ‘items which have already been purchased and will be drawn 
from trading stock on hand at the end of the year of assessment would need to be 
excluded’ (SARS, 2014(3):25).  
 
Example 10 of IN 78 refers to gift vouchers redeemable at a homeware department. This 
example explains the fact that certain costs must be excluded when calculating the section 
24C allowance for future expenditure. However, IN 78 does not indicate, how a taxpayer 
will know at the end of the year of assessment whether a customer redeeming a voucher 
in a subsequent year of assessment will draw from trading stock on hand at the end of 
such year of assessment, or trading stock that will only be acquired in the subsequent year 
of assessment. The cost of the former must, according to paragraph 7.1 of IN 78, be 
excluded from ‘future expenditure’, while the cost of the latter can be included. It is 
suggested that example 10 be expanded to provide further assistance in this regard.  
 
5.4.2 Trading stock 
Although it is correct to say that trading stock on hand at the end of the year of 
assessment, which will be utilised by a taxpayer in a subsequent year of assessment in 
the performance of his unconditional obligation under a contract, cannot be included as 
‘future expenditure’, there is, however, an anomaly that arises. The anomaly can be 
explained as follows with reference to the provisions that regulate trading stock:  
 
 The expenditure for the trading stock at hand at the end of the year of assessment is 
already actually incurred and, therefore, deductible under section 11(a), provided it 
meets all the requirements of section 11(a).  
 However, due to the working of section 22(1), which requires the taxpayer to take the 
value of the trading stock, not disposed of at the end of the year of assessment, into 
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account in the calculation of his taxable income, the taxpayer has not yet received an 
actual tax deduction for the expenditure actually incurred.  
 The taxpayer will also not be allowed a section 24C allowance, because the 
expenditure will not meet the requirement of section 24C(1). 
 The anomaly: The taxpayer has, therefore, already received income from the contract, 
and he is obligated to utilise the trading stock that he acquired in the performance of 
his obligation under the contract, but he doesn’t receive any tax relief for the 
expenditure actually incurred or in the form of a section 24C(2) deduction. 
 The amount of trading stock utilised by the taxpayer in the performance of his 
obligation under the contract will, however, be allowed as a deduction from income in 
a subsequent year of assessment, as required by section 24C(1)(a). This is due to the 
working of section 22(2), which stipulates that the value of the trading stock held and 
not disposed of at the beginning of the year of assessment is deductible from taxable 
income.  
 
Example 5.1 further explains the effect that the aforementioned situation has on the 
normal tax liability of the taxpayer. 
 
Example 5.1 
During the current year of assessment (‘year one’), the taxpayer, a company, receives 
R1 000 income from a customer under a contract. The taxpayer is unconditionally 
obligated to supply, in terms of his obligation under the contract, trading stock to the value 
of R800 to the customer in the next year of assessment (‘year two’). Two scenarios 
regarding to the acquisition of the trading stock can arise: 
 
Scenario A:   
The taxpayer acquired the R800 trading stock in year one, the same year in which the 
income was received. He will utilise this trading stock to meet his obligations under the 
contract in year two. The trading stock is not yet disposed of at the end of year one.  
 
Scenario B: 
The taxpayer will acquire the R800 trading stock in year two to meet his obligations under 
the contract in year two. 
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The effect of scenario A on the taxpayer’s normal tax liability in year one and year two is 
as follows: 
Scenario A  Year one Year two 
Income 
- Income from contract  1 000 - 
- Section 24C(3) allowance -  - 
Section 11(a) deduction:  (800)   -  
Section 22(2) -  (800)  
Section 22(1)  800  - 
Section 24C allowance (not allowed)*   -  - 
Effect on taxable income  1 000  (800)  
Effect on normal tax liability (tax at 28%)  280  (224) 
 
* According to the established interpretation of section 24C, the ‘future expenditure’ 
requirement of section 24C(1) will not be met, as the taxpayer has already incurred the 
expenditure for the trading stock in year one.  
 
The effect of scenario B on the taxpayer’s normal tax liability in year one and year two is 
as follows: 
Scenario B Year one Year two 
Income   
- Income from contract 1 000 - 
- Section 24C(3) allowance -  800  
Section 11(a) deduction:  -   (800)  
Section 22(2) - - 
Section 22(1)  -   -  
Section 24C allowance**  (800)  - 
Effect on taxable income  200   -  
Effect on normal tax liability (tax at 28%) 56   0  
 
** According to the established interpretation of section 24C, the ‘future expenditure’ 
requirement of section 24C(1) will be met, as the taxpayer will incur the expenditure for the 
trading stock in year two. 
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Comparing the effect on the normal tax liability in scenarios A and B: 
 
In scenario A the taxpayer is taxed on the full R1 000 in year one. The income and the 
deduction are not matched in year one and, due to section 22(1), the tax deduction is 
postponed to year two. In year two, section 22(2) allows for a deduction of the opening 
trading stock and the effect is that the taxpayer’s taxable income and, accordingly, the 
normal tax liability will be reduced. The net effect of the normal tax liability in year one and 
year two is R56. It is, however, important to note that the taxpayer is liable for normal tax 
on the full R1 000 when he receives it, despite the fact that he has already actually 
incurred expenditure, which will be utilised in the performance of his obligation under the 
contract.  
 
In scenario B, the income and the future expenditure are matched in year one and the 
taxpayer is, accordingly, liable for normal tax on the profit from the contract in year one. In 
year two the section 24C allowance is reversed and the section 11(a) deduction is allowed. 
The net effect on normal tax liability in year two is R0. The net effect of the normal tax 
liability in year one and year two is R56. 
 
5.4.3 The intention of the Legislator with section 24C  
From the Explanatory Memorandum on section 24C it seems that the Legislator, with the 
insertion of section 24C, wanted to address situations where income is received or 
accrued in terms of a contract in one year of assessment, and the income is to be utilised 
to finance future expenditure. The Explanatory Memorandum, however, further states that 
‘in a number of instances such advance payments are not matched by deductible 
expenditure, resulting in the full amount of the advance payment being subjected to tax’ 
(SARS, 1980:9).  
 
As shown in 5.4.1, based on the actual wording in section 24C(1), the trading stock on 
hand which will be utilised by a taxpayer in the performance of his unconditional obligation 
under a contract in a subsequent year of assessment, does not meet the requirements of 
section 24C(1). It does, however, seems that the aforementioned trading stock falls within 
the ambit of the Legislator’s original intention with section 24C, namely to provide for an 
allowance, so that the taxable income can be matched with the deductible expenditure.  
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However, as shown in Example 5.1, scenario A, due to the effect of section 22(1), and the 
fact that the expenditure is already actually incurred, the taxable income and deductible 
expenditure are not matched, despite the fact that the taxpayer has an unconditional 
obligation to perform under the contract from which the income was received.  
 
The following two questions arise from the aforementioned: 
 
 Could it have been the Legislator’s intention to place the taxpayer who has already 
incurred expenditure, but has not yet received a deduction, in a less favourable tax 
position than the taxpayer who is yet to incur the expenditure, as shown in Example 
5.1?  
 Should the Legislator not amend section 24C in order to clarify the effect that the 
provisions of sections 22(1) and 22(2) has on the interpretation of section 24C?  
 
These questions will remain unanswered in the assignment. The final Interpretation Note 
on section 24C will be examined to see whether SARS made any amendments to its 
interpretation of the interplay between section 24C and trading stock. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Chapter 5 showed that IN 78 introduced new guidelines, not previously discussed in 
chapter 2, 3 or 4, relating to the interpretation of section 24C. It was, however, shown that 
there are shortcomings to the formulation of some of these guidelines. 
 
It is clear from IN 78 that section 24C only applies to ‘expenditure’ and not to ‘losses’.  
IN 78, however, does not specify whether: 
  
 SARS is of the opinion that fortuitous expenditure or money involuntarily spent is a 
loss and, therefore, not deductible under section 24C or whether it is ‘expenditure’ 
and, therefore, deductible under section 24C; and 
 A loss which can, in certain circumstance, be equated to the word ‘expenditure’, as 
was shown by Watermeyer CJ, is deductible under section 24C. 
 
IN 78 introduces for the first time the phrases a high degree of probability, inevitability and 
certainty that expenditure will be incurred and a potential contractual obligation to perform 
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under a contract. The question is raised whether these undefined words and phrases 
might cause confusion when interpreting section 24C. It is suggested that  
IN 78 should define these phrases and explain how the high degree will be measured.  
 
It was shown that the fact that the incurral of the future expenditure must be inevitable is 
similar to the indicator established in 3.4.1, namely, that the taxpayer must have an 
unconditional obligation to perform under the contract, if he wants to prove that future 
expenditure will be incurred. 
 
IN 78 indicates that the taxpayer must also prove that it is probable that the expenditure 
will be incurred. It was shown that this is a new indicator that will serve to demonstrate that 
future expenditure will be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations 
under the contract. Historical data can be used to determine the probability that an 
unconditional obligation will, in fact, be performed and that the related future expenditure 
will be incurred. When the taxpayer’s performance under a contract is dependent on the 
customer taking action, the obligation to perform remains unconditional. The probability 
that the customer will take action must, however, be considered.  
 
IN 78 referred to situations where a taxpayer’s performance is only potentially contractually 
obligatory. It was shown that these words are similar to when a taxpayer has a conditional 
obligation to perform under a contract, and that the section 24C allowance will not be 
allowed in such circumstances. It is suggested, that in order to avoid confusion, the words 
potentially contractually obligatory in IN 78 should be replaced with ‘a taxpayer that has a 
conditional obligation to perform under a contract.  
 
IN 78 specifically states that trading stock already purchased at the end of a year of 
assessment and which will be utilised in a subsequent year of assessment in the 
performance of the taxpayer’s obligation under a contract, must be excluded from the 
section 24C allowance. This is because the expenditure is not ‘future expenditure’. It was 
shown that this interpretation is in agreement with the established interpretation of section 
24C, based on the words and phrases used in section 24C. It is, however, questioned 
whether the established interpretation of section 24C, is in agreement with the Legislator’s 
original intention with section 24C, namely, to match income received under a contract 
with the related deductible expenditure. It was also asked whether the Legislator should 
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not amend section 24C in order to clarify the effect that the provisions of sections 22(1) 
and 22(2) has on the interpretation of section 24C?  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
Section 24C provides for a deduction of future expenditure that will be incurred by the 
taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under a contract from which the taxpayer 
derived income.  
 
Due to some uncertainties that exist regarding the meaning of certain words and phrases 
used in section 24C, the aim of this assignment was to determine the meaning of the word 
‘expenditure’ and the phrase ‘will be incurred’ as used in section 24C. Further, in order to 
establish how a taxpayer will be able to prove that he will incur future expenditure in the 
performance of his obligations under a contract, the effect of contractual terms and other 
circumstances on the certainty that future expenditure will be incurred in such a manner, 
were investigated. Lastly, this assignment discussed certain additional guidelines provided 
for in IN 78, regarding the aforementioned research goals.  
 
It was established that in the context of section 24C the word ‘expenditure’ means the 
amount of money spent, including the disbursement of other assets with a monetary value. 
The word ‘expenditure’ will include inter alia a voluntary payment of money by the taxpayer 
and the voluntary disbursement of the taxpayer’s assets. It was shown that the word 
‘expenditure’ can include a loss if the word ‘loss’ can be equated to the word ‘expenditure’.  
 
The phrase ‘will be incurred’ implies that the taxpayer will, in a subsequent year of 
assessment, have an unconditional obligation to pay for expenditure, which will arise from 
the taxpayer’s obligations to perform in terms of the contract.  
 
It was established that if there is certainty that the taxpayer will perform his obligations 
under the contract, it will indicate that there is certainty regarding the incurral of the related 
future expenditure. It was further shown that each indivisible performance that the 
taxpayer must render to fulfill the obligations created by the contract, must be identified to 
determine whether it will lead to the incurral of the future expenditure. 
 
Contractual terms regulate the performance of the contracting parties. Conditions and 
warranties are contractual terms that indicate that there is uncertainty regarding the 
taxpayer’s obligations to perform under the contract. The absence of conditions or 
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warranties in a contract, or, the inclusion of a time clause in a contract can indicate that 
there is certainty regarding the taxpayer’s obligations to perform under the contract. 
 
Certain other circumstances that can indicate whether there is certainty that the future 
expenditure will be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under the 
contract were identified. It was shown that a definite connection must exist between the 
incurral of future expenditure and the taxpayer’s obligations to perform under the contract. 
 
A distinction must be made between a contingent liability that is not deductible in terms of 
section 11(a) and a conditional obligation to perform under a contract. Only the latter 
should be taken into consideration when determining whether future expenditure will be 
incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under the contract. 
 
Unquantified future expenditure that will be incurred in terms of a contract, will not indicate 
that the incurral of the future expenditure is uncertain. An estimate of the amount of future 
expenditure that will be incurred must be based on fair and reasonable grounds.  
 
The specific terms of maintenance and repair contracts should be carefully read to 
determine whether the taxpayer is unconditionally obligated to maintain and repair certain 
assets or whether the contract contains both conditional and unconditional obligations to 
repair or maintain an asset.  
 
A taxpayer cannot group similar contracts with similar conditional obligations to perform 
together in order to determine the probability, and thus the certainty that future expenditure 
will be incurred in the performance of the taxpayer’s obligations under a contract.  
IN 78 showed that in order to attain the required degree of certainty, the taxpayer must 
also be able to prove the probability that he will perform the unconditional obligation under 
the contract. The probability of the taxpayer’s performance can be determined with 
reference to historical data. 
 
Although IN 78 provides additional guidelines which address this assignment’s research 
goals, some shortcomings to these new guidelines were identified. IN 78 does not specify 
whether fortuitous expenditure or money involuntarily spent is a loss or ‘expenditure’. It 
also does not indicate whether a loss which can, in certain circumstances, be equated to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
105 
 
the word ‘expenditure’, is deductible under section 24C. It is suggested that IN 78 needs to 
be amended to provide clarity in this regard. 
 
IN 78 states that the Commissioner must be satisfied that there is a high degree of 
probability and inevitability, as well as a high degree of certainty that the expenditure will 
be incurred by the taxpayer. These phrases are, however, not defined in IN 78, and the 
question was raised whether these undefined phrases might cause confusion when 
interpreting section 24C. It is suggested that IN 78 should define these phrases and 
explain how the high degree will be measured.  
 
IN 78 refers to the situation where a taxpayer’s performance is only potentially 
contractually obligatory. It was shown that this is similar to when a taxpayer has a 
conditional obligation to perform under a contract. It is, however, suggested that the words 
potentially contractually obligatory as used in IN 78 should be replaced with ‘a taxpayer 
that has a conditional obligation to perform under a contract’.  
 
Lastly, an anomaly occurs regarding trading stock at hand at the end of a year of 
assessment, which will be utilised in a subsequent year of assessment in the performance 
of the taxpayer’s obligation under a contract. Such trading stock does not represent ‘future 
expenditure’ and must be excluded from the section 24C allowance. However, due to the 
interplay between section 24C and section 22(1), the taxpayer does not receive any tax 
relief for the expenditure actually incurred to acquire the closing trading stock, in the year 
in which the trading stock is acquired.  
 
It is questioned whether the established interpretation of section 24C is in agreement with 
the Legislator’s original intention with section 24C, namely, to match income received 
under a contract with the related deductible expenditure. It is also asked whether the 
Legislator should not amend section 24C in order to clarify the effect that the provisions of 
sections 22(1) and 22(2) has on the interpretation of section 24C. It remains to be seen 
whether SARS will make any amendments to section 24C, in order to accommodate the 
interplay between section 24C and trading stock. 
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ANNEXURE A: EXTRACTS FROM THE INCOME TAX ACT NO 58 OF 1962 
24C. Allowance in respect of future expenditure on contracts. — (1) For the purposes 
of this section, “future expenditure” in relation to any year of assessment means an 
amount of expenditure which the Commissioner is satisfied will be incurred after the end of 
such year— 
(a)  in such manner that such amount will be allowed as a deduction from income in a 
subsequent year of assessment; 
or 
(b) in respect of the acquisition of any asset in respect of which any deduction will be 
admissible under the provisions of this Act. 
 
(2) If the income of any taxpayer in any year of assessment includes or consists of an 
amount received by or accrued to him in terms of any contract and the Commissioner is 
satisfied that such amount will be utilized in whole or in part to finance future expenditure 
which will be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under such 
contract, there shall be deducted in the determination of the taxpayer’s taxable income for 
such year such allowance (not exceeding the said amount) as the Commissioner may 
determine, in respect of so much of such future expenditure as in his opinion relates to the 
said amount. 
 
(3) The amount of any allowance deducted under subsection (2) in any year of 
assessment shall be deemed to be income received by or accrued to the taxpayer in the 
following year of assessment. 
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